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ADMINISTRATIVE

LAw-POWER

OF FEDERAL COURT UPON REMAND

TO

DETERMINE PROCEDURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY. [United States

Supreme Court]
A significant decision in the field of administrative law and procedure has recently been rendered by the United States Supreme Court.
This case, FederalCommunicationsCommission v. PottsvilleBroadcasting Co.,1 defines the scope of a remand from the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to the Federal Communications

Commission after an appeal from the Commission's finding. The opin2
ion, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, was for a unanimous court.
The proceedings began in 1936 when the Pottsville Broadcasting
Company sought a permit to build a station at Pottsville, Pennsylvania.
The permit was refused by the Commission at that time, due to findings
that the applicant company lacked financial responsibility and did not
sufficiently represent local Pottsville interests. The applicant appealed
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. That court reversed the decision of the Commission as to the financial qualification 3-that finding being dearly based on an error in construing Pennsylvania law-and remanded the case to the Commission "for reconsideration in accordance with the views expressed." 4
Prior to this decision of the Court of Appeals two other applications
were made to the Commission for the facilities sought by the Pottsville
Company, and hearings were held, but no disposition of the question
was made. After the remand the Commission declared that all three
applications should be considered together and "on a comparative
basis." The Pottsville Company then sought and was granted a writ of
mandamus from the same Court of Appeals ordering the Commission
to consider and decide the application of the Pottsville Company "on
the basis of the record as originally made" and not "on a comparative
16o S. Ct. 437, 8 U. S. L. Week 198 (1940).
2

Mr. Justice McReynolds concurred in the result.
Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 69 App. D. C. 7, 98 F. (2d) 288 (1938).
The court was composed of Groner, C. J., Miller and Edgerton, JJ.
'The court felt that the Commission's decision was based on the financial responsibility point rather than on the ground of insufficient local representation. But
the decision of the Court of Appeals did not foreclose a finding by the Commission
that this second ground alone was sufficient to disqualify the applicant. See 69 App.
D. C. 7, 98 F. (2d) 288, 291 (1938).
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basis" with the later applicants. 5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
"because important issues of administrative law are involved." 6 When
the case was heard on the merits, the Court held that after a remand
from the Court of Appeals, although the Commission is bound to act
upon the court's correction of errors of law, it is not impliedly foreclosed by the court's mandate "from enforcing the legislative policy
committed to its charge." Since the policy in question was to judge the
applications in the light of "public convenience, interest, or necessity,"
consideration of the three applications on a comparative basis is permissible after the remand and regardless of the priority of the Pottsville Company's application.
The Federal Communications Commission was created by the Communications Act of 1934.7 Among its duties are the granting and the
renewal of licenses to applicants who desire to operate broadcasting
stations, if "public convenience, interest, or necessity" will thereby be
served.8 In making its decision on these and other matters the Commission was granted by Congress a wide range of discretionary powers
to formulate its own rules of procedure in investigations and hearings. 9
An appeal from a decision of the Commission by an applicant for a
construction permit for a radio station is allowed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. 10 The court's review is
limited to "questions of law"; and "findings of fact by the Commission,
if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive unless it shall
clearly appear that the findings of the Commission are abitrary or capricious."" When the Commission's finding is reversed, the cause is
remanded to the Commission to carry out the court's judgment.
When the principal case was before the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Mr. Chief Justice Groner was of the opinion that
"Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 7o App. D. C. 157, 1o5 F. (2d) 36 (1939).
The court consisted of Groner, C. J., Stephens and Edgerton, JJ.

048 Stat. io94 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 402 (e) (1939).

148 Stat. 1o64 (1934), as amended by 5o Stat. 189 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A. § 151 (1939).
848 Stat. 1o83 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 307 (1939).
948 Stat. 1068 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 15 4 (i) (j) (1939). A recent and very important
paper based'on investigation may be consulted for information regarding the inner
workings of the Commission. See Federal Communications Commission, Monograph
No. 3,Vol. i, prepared by the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure. Also see Caldwell, Comments on the Procedure of Federal Administrative
Tribunals with Particular Reference to the Federal Communications Commission
(1939) 7 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 74o .
1048 Stat. 1093 (1934) as amended by 5o Stat. 197 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A. § 402(b)

(1939).

"48 Stat. 1o94 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. §

402(e) (1939).
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the remand was one which was conclusive of all questions, excepting
only that of the possible insufficient representation of Pottsville interests by the applicant company. 12 His position was that "the order of
the court entered on an appeal from the Commission ought to have the
same effect and be governed by the same rules as apply in appeals from
a lower federal court to an appellate federal court in an equity proceeding."' 3 In such a case, matters determined by the appellate court
cannot after the remand be again raised and retried in the lower federal court.' 4 But the decision of the appellate court is only binding as
to matters actually decided. The lower court is free to act on all other
matters not mentioned in the remand.' 5 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in his
opinion in the principal case, pointed out that even if the view be
adopted that the remand to the Commission is governed by the same
rules as a remand from upper to lower court, the present controversy
is not solved. This was so, apparently, because the Supreme Court found
that the Court of Appeals' remand to the Commission did not contain
any specific direction as to whether the further proceedings should be
on an individual or on a comparative basis.' 6 But the actual ground of
the Court's decision is found in broader considerations, for Mr. Justice
Frankfurter denies that the analogy of the relation between court and
court applies where court and administrative body are concerned. For
here is in issue the interplay of authority granted to the Commission by
Congress' 7 under its power to control commerce, as opposed to the reviewing power as granted to the federal courts by Congress's under
Article III of the Constitution. The Federal Communications Act, in
the sections granting licensing powers to the Commission, does not indude any express provision on the question of whether the Commission in any case is to pass upon applications on an indvidual or a comparative basis, nor does the judicial review section expressly provide
2Mr. Chief Justice Groner, it may be of interest to note, is one of the members
of the Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, mentioned in

note 9, supra.

' 3Pottsville Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 70 App. D. C. 157, 105 F. (2d) S6, 39
(1939).
"Latta v. Granger, 167 U. S. 8S, 17 S. Ct. 746, 42 L. ed. 85 (1897).
IsEx Parte Union Steamboat Co., 178 U. S. 317, 20 S.Ct. 904, 44 L. ed. io84 (goo).
"See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 6o S.
Ct. 437, 44o (1940): "The Court of Appeals invoked against the Commission the familiar doctrine that a lower court is bound to respect the mandate of an appellate
tribunal and cannot consider questions which the mandate has laid at rest.... That
proposition is indisputable, but it does not tell us what issues were laid at rest."
"748 Stat. 1083 (1934), 47 U. S. C. A. § 307(a) (1939).
1848 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended by 50 Stat. 197 (1937), 47 U. S. C. A. § 402(b)
(1939).
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that the Court of Appeals may upon remand instruct the Commission
as to how it shall proceed in this respect. Consequently, the Supreme
Court was compelled to determine the congressional intent upon implications drawn from the Act. And the Court found in the Commission's authority to pass on license applications on public convenience
standards, the implication that the Commission should determine its
methods of proceeding, preferring this conclusion to the contrary solution of broadening judicial control over the Commission's actions. 19
The desirability of such a conclusion is demonstrated by the very
case here under consideration. To have granted the application of the
Pottsville Company without a consideration of the merits of the other
applications would not have satisfied the requirements that the public
convenience, interest, or necessity be the controlling factor. That the
Commission made an error of law while refusing the application, could
not tend to mean that after the correction of the error, the application
must necessarily be granted without any further consideration.
The issue of the principal case does not fit neatly into the usual pattern of the problems of administrative law cases. It cannot be classified
simply as involving a determination with respect to the proper scope of
"judicial review", since that term is used to denote the power of a
court to review administrative decisions upon the merits of the questions at issue.2 0 Nor can the instant case be viewed merely as a determination relative to the internal procedure to be followed by a commission, since the recent cases dealing with that problem concerned
"the procedure in the first instance of administrative agencies themselves. '21 Rather, the case defines the scope of judicial control over administrative procedure after remand from court to commission: whether
OSee Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. i, 26, 58 S. Ct. 999, 1001, 82 L. ed. 1129
(1938). There after a remand to the Secretary of Agriculture, the court said: "What
further proceedings the Secretary may see fit to take in the light of our decision ...,
are not matters which we should attempt to forecast or hypothetically to decide."
See alsor F. R. C. v. Nelson Bros. Bond and M. Co., 289 U. S. 266, 277, 53 S.Ct. 627,
633, 77 L. ed. 1166 (1933).
2nThus in Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U. S. 287, 40 S.Ct.
527, 64 L. ed. 9o8 (1920), it was held that where the constitutional question of a
confiscatory rate was being considered "the state must provide a fair opportunity for
submitting that issue to a judicial tribunal for determination upon its own independent judgment as to both law and facts."
21See Morgan v. United States, 304 U. S. 1,58 S. Ct. 773, 82 L. ed. 1129 (1938)
where the court spoke of the basic requirements of fair play in administrative procedure generally. For a general review of the problems confronting students and
workers in the field of administrative law and procedure see Fuchs, Introductory
Comment to a Symposium on Administrative Law (1919) 9 Am. L. School Rev.
139, 140.
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the court could "write the principle of priority into the statute as an
indirect result of its power to scrutinize legal errors." 22 In answering,
that "Only Congress could confer such a priority," 23 the Supreme Court,
although on a narrow point, seems definitely to have departed from its
former attitude of mistrust2 4 and to have adopted a viewpoint sympathetic toward the administrative process. 25- This is not too surprising in
the light of the earlier opinions of Mr. Justice Brandeis while a member of the Court 26, and of the presence of Mr. Justice Frankfurter on
the reconstituted Bench.2 7
JOHN E. PERRY

CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-LIABILITY IN TORT OF HOSPITAL TO PATIENT.

[Colorado]
In O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Association,' plaintiff brought an action against defendant for negligence in the care and
medical treatment furnished her while a paying patient in defendant's
sanitarium. To defendant's answer, alleging nonliability by reason of
its being a charitable institution, plaintiff replied that a judgment
would in no way affect the funds of the association used for charitable
purposes, because it had secured a contract of insurance indemnifying
it against all liability for the torts of its agents or servants in the conduct
of the hospital business. To this replication demurrers were sustained
in the trial court and judgment was entered dismissing the action. The
Colorado Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case.
2See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 6o S.
Ct. 437. 443 (1940).
2See Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co., 6o S.
Ct. 437, 443 (1940).
"This mistrust of administrative bodies by the courts was dramatically shown by

the case of Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U. S. 1, 23, 56 S. Ct.
654, 661, 8o L. ed. 1015 (1936).
"Such an attitude of friendliness toward the administrative is to be noted in the
lectures of Dean James M. Landis. See Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) 135.
"See the dissent of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 65,
88-89, 52 S. Ct. 285, 298, 307, 76 L. ed. 598 (1932). That the function of courts toward
administrative bodies was one of control rather than of review is the main thesis of
the dissent. For other cases by Mr. Justice Brandeis see Frankfurter, Mr. Justice
Brandeis and the Constitution (1931) 45 Harv. L. Rev. 33, 110.
"Mr. Justice Frankfurter's position during his years as teacher and authority
on administrative law is shown in his article, The Task of Administrative Law (1927)
75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 614. The author says at page 617: "It is idle to feel either blind
resentment against 'government by Commission' or sterile longing for a golden past
that never was."
'196 P. (2d) 835 (Colo. 1939).
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The court was of the opinion that where the charitable institution
has insured itself against liability for negligence the public policy requiring that such association be immune2 from tort liability is not
transgressed. The court said that while it was committed to the trust
fund doctrine to protect the funds of the charitable association from
being dissipated by judgments in tort actions, that doctrine did not bar
a suit against a charitable institution based on the tort of its servant or
agent, but only prevented the levying of execution on any property
which was part of the charitable trust. It was held, therefore, that an
action against such a defendant would be denied only where the testimony affirmatively disclosed that a charitable trust existed, and that a
judgment against such trust, if satisfied, would deplete the trust fund.3
American courts have quite consistently held that charitable institutions are not liable to beneficiaries for the torts of their agents or
servants so long as they have not been negligent in selecting or retaining such agents or servants. 4 The leading case, establishing this rule in
England, turned on the so-called trust fund doctrine. 5 In that case an
orphan alleged that he had been refused admittance to an orphanage
contrary to the terms of its charter. The court held that to make the
orphanage liable in damages would be a direct violation of the purposes of the trust under which it operated. It was said that the trust
fund could not be made liable and that even though the action was in
form against the trustee, if it appeared that it was in fact against the
fund, it could not be sustained.
The leading exponent in America of this rule of immunity has been
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. In a comparatively early
decision by that court, McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital,6
2Following the language of most court opinions, the words "immunity" and "exemption" are used interchangeably in this discussion.
'Brown v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 74o (1929). See also St.
Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22, 24 (1925): "The presumption
is that they [charitable institutions] have power to hold other property. If they have
there is no more reason to say that they are not liable for torts than to say that a
natural person is not because he has no property not exempt from execution. We
think that the judgment against these corporations is valid, but that no property
which they hold in charitable trust can be taken under execution ..
41o Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed. 1931) § 4923.
Feofees of Heriot's Hosp. v. Ross, 12 C. & F. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 15o8 (H. L. 1846).
8120 Mass. 432, 436, 21 Am. Rep. 529, 533 (1876): "The funds entrusted .. .are
not to be diminished by such casualties, if those immediately controlling them have
done their whole duty in reference to those who have sought to obtain the benefit
of them." The court here relies to a certain extent on Holliday v. St. Leonard's
Vestry, S. C. 3o L. J. C. P. 361, 142 Eng. Rep. 769 (1861) (the Vestry gratuitously dis-
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it was held that if there had been no neglect on the part of those administering the trust and if due care had been used by them in the selection of their inferior agents, there could be no liability. This case
also adopted the trust fund doctrine.
Another basis for disallowing an action by a beneficiary against a
charitable institution which has been adopted in various American jurisdictions from time to time is the "waiver theory."7 In Schloendorfl v.
Society of New York HospitalsJudge Cardozo, while denying liability
on the ground that the tort was that of a physician acting in the capacity of an independent contractor, expressly approved a previous
New York decision,9 no longer followed in the state, 10 that one becoming a patient in a charitable institution impliedly waived his right to
recover for the negligence of the servants or agents of the institution by
accepting the charity, even though he might pay to help defray the
expenses.
Other cases hold that there can be no liability in the type of case
under consideration, because the doctrine of respondeat superior will
not apply when the master is receiving no pecuniary profit or other
benefit from the employment of the servant or agent."
Finally, the most common basis for the rule of exemption is said to
be the public policy which fosters such charities and will not allol anything to be done to hinder their creation, maintenance, or efficient operation.1 2 Essentially this is the real reason in all of the cases upholding
charged the duty of surveying the public highways and was held not responsible for
the negligence of its employees in the performance of a public function); accord,
Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 26o N. W. 476 (1935).
But see Cohen v. General Hospital Society of Connecticut, i,3 Conn. 188, 154 At.
435, 436 (1931): "A charitable institution is not a state institution acting as an agency
of the sovereign. It is not immune because of the public character of the charity."
TPowers v. Massachusetts Homoeopathic Hosp., iog Fed. 294 (C. C. A. ist, 19o ),
cert. denied, 183 U. S. 695, 22 S. Ct. 932, 46 L. ed. 394 (19oi); Burdell v. St. Luke's
Hosp., 37 Cal. App. 31o, 173 Pac. ioo8 (1918); Mikota v. Sisters of Mercy, 183 Iowa
1378, 168 N. V. 219 (1918); Cook v. Norton Infirmary, 18o Ky. 331, 202 S. WV. 874
1918); Pepke v. Grace Hosp., 130 Mich. 493, 90 N. V. 278 (1902).
8211 N. Y. 125, 1o5 N. E. 92 (1914).
0Hordern v. Salvation Army, 199 N. Y. 233, 92 N. E. 626 (1910); accord, Barr v.
Brooklyn Children's Aid Society, igo N. Y. Supp. 296 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1921).
"0Sheehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N. Y. 163, 7 N. E. (2d) 28
(1937)nUnion Pacific Ry. v. Artist, 6o Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894); Fordyce v. Woman's
Christian Nat. Library Ass'n, 79 Ark. 55o, 96 S. IV. 155 (19o6); Hogan v. Chicago
Lying-in Hosp. & Dispensary, 335 Ill. 42, 166 N. E. 461 (1929); Roberts v. Kirksville
College of Osteopathy & Surgery, 16 S. V. (2d) 625 (Mo. App. 1929); Baylor Univ. v.
Boyd,
18 S. IV. (2d) 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
1
Ettlinger v. Trustees of Randolph-Macon College, 31 F. (2d) 869 (C. C. A. 4th,
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the nonliability rule-a reason which embraces all of the others.
Whether the courts admit it or not, it is this public policy which has
led to the formulation of the other principles.' 3
All of these reasons for nonliability have been severely criticised on
occasion, many of the criticisms coming from courts repudiating one
basis in favor of another, and others from courts repudiating the rule
altogether. The result has been mass of confused and conflicting opinions. And further, the extent of the immunity-whether it exists in actions brought by servants or strangers as well as by patients-has varied
considerably in different jurisdictions, depending upon which theory
4
the particular case has turned.'
Perhaps the earliest complete repudiation of the rule was in Glavin
v. Rhode Island Hospital.'5 Plaintiff sued for damages for personal injuries suffered while a paying patient in defendant's hospital, the injuries being due to the negligence of defendant's servant. The court
stated that the corporation owed patients the duty of due care in the
selection of competent agents and servants; that when such agents or
servants acted negligently, their negligence was that of the corporation
Emery v. Jewish Hosp. Ass'n, 193 Ky. 400, 236 S. W. 577 (1921); Duncan v.
92 Neb. 162, 137 N. W. 1120 (1912); D'Amato v. Orange Memorial Hosp., ioi N. J. L. 61, 127 At. 340 (1925); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476 (1935). But see Basabo v. Salvation Army,
35 R. 1. 22, 85 At. 12o, 129 (912): "Public policy does not require that a charitable
corporation be held exempt, but, on the other hand, to relieve it from liability
would be contrary to true public policy.... Just as such a servant has a lawful right
to recover his stipulated wages . . . and to recover damages for breach of his contract ... so also would he be entitled to recover for injuries due to the negligence
of his master and so also would his master be liable for his torts and negligence
while in the service of the master, as in any other case. There is no reason nor logic
in the attempted distinction between the servant of the defendant and the servant
of any other person or corporation."
IsWeston's Adm'x v. Hosp. of St. Vincent of Paul, 131 Va. 587, 600, 107 S. E. 785,
789 (1921): "Indeed the trust fund doctrine is simply a rule of public policy."
"'Kellogg v. Church Charity Foundation, 128 App. Div. 214, 218, 112 N. Y. Supp.
566 (2nd Dep't 1911), aff'd, 203 N. Y. 191, 96 N. E. 406 (1911): "The law may imply
an intention on the part of the donors of the charitable funds that such funds shall
be used for the charitable purposes only, and then imply an acquiescence in this intention by all persons who accept the benefits. . . . But no such acquiescence or
waiver can be attributed to an outsider." Enman v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 170
N. E. 43 (Mass. 193o ) (trust fund doctrine followed to its logical conclusion; recovery
denied to strangers as well as beneficiaries); Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal
Church, 147 Mich. 230, 11o N. W. 951 (1907) (nonliability on trust fund doctrine
limited to beneficiaries); Daniels v. Rahway Hosp., i6o At. 644 (N. J. 1932) (nonliability on public policy limited to beneficiaries); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess
Society, 218 Wis. i69, 26o N. W. 476 (1935) (nonliability on public policy extended
to strangers).
2512 R. I. 411, 34 Am. Rep. 675 (1879).
1929);

Nebraska Sanitarium,
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itself, inasmuch as they were the representatives of the corporation. It
was expressly denied that there is any logical foundation for the doctrine of generally immunity from tort liability on the ground of a public policy against the diversion of trust funds from the purposes of the
trust. For, where a charitable corporation has funds available for general purposes it may apply such funds to pay damages for which it is
held liable, inasmuch as this liability is incurred in carrying out the
trust and is incident to it. In short, a charitable institution is liable in
tort on the same basis as any other corporation.' 6
The Rhode Island decision was followed in Alabama in 1915 in
Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association.17 The court in the latter case
noted that the trust fund doctrine had been abandoned in England 8
and in Canada. 19 It was pointed out that to follow the trust fund theory
to its logical conclusion, it would be necessary to grant absolute nonliability to charitable institutions in tort, when in fact the majority rule
in America is definitely opposed to nonliability as to strangers and servants. 20 The court delivered a sound and compelling criticism of the
trust fund doctrine.21 On the question of the application of the rule of
respondeat superior, it was said that it is entirely immaterial to its operation whether the master receives any pecuniary profit or other benefit from the employment of the servant or agent. 22 It was further said
21This case is no longer controlling in Rhode Island, a statute having been passed
exempting charitable hospitals from liability for the torts of any "of its officers,
agents or employees in the management of, or for the care of treatment of, any of
the patients or inmates of such hospital." Public Laws 1930, c. 1612, amending General Laws 1909, c. 213.
171g1 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4 (1915).
1
8Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, ii H. L. Cas. 686, ii Eng. Rep. 15oo (1866).
nLavere v. Smith's Falls Public Hosp., 35 Ont. L. R. 98, 9 B. R. C. 13 (1915).
2
Regarding liability to servants and strangers, see io Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm.
Ed. 1931) § 4924.
2191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 8 (1915): "The doctrine that the will of an individual
shall exempt either persons or property from the operation of general laws is inconsistent with the fundamental idea of government. Nor can I conceive any ground
upon which a court can hold that effect can be given to that will when it relates to
property devised or conveyed for the purpose of a charitable trust."
2But see Southern Methodist Hosp. v. Wilson, 45 Ariz. 507, 46 P. (2d) 118, 125
(1935): "The rule of respondeat superior . . . was originally founded solely on reasons of public policy.. . . We think there are circumstances under which the application of that rule should, for the reasons of public policy also, be limited, and
we are of the opinion that while it may do an injustice in individual cases, yet upon
the whole, it is for the best interests of the public to encourage the establishment
and maintenance of charitable institutions by advising the donors thereto that their
funds will not be diverted from their original purpose of charity to pay for the
negligence of the employees of such an institution ......
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that the soundness of the rule of exemption on the ground of public
policy should be determined by the legislature and not by the judiciary.
The court did not decide whether a non-paying patient could be held
to have waived any right of action against the association, but refused
to apply the waiver theory in the case of a paying patient. Nonliability
on the waiver theory, said the court "if held to be sound, must rest upon
the fact that it is the giving and receiving of charity that creates the exemption, and not the nature of the institution administering it."23
An increasing number of American jurisdictions have adopted the
rule of the Glavin and Tucker cases.24 However, the great weight of
authority holds to the rule of the Massachusetts General Hospital
case, 25 that a charitable institution is not liable for the torts of its agents
or servants if due care has been used in their selection and maintenance.2 6 A smaller number of jurisdictions grant absolute immunity in
tort to charitable institutions, whether the action be brought by bene27
ficiary, servant, or stranger.
In comparatively recent years, the courts of some jurisdictions have
apparently begun to recognize the harshness of the majority rule and
have made more or less successful attempts to limit without definitely
Mgi Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 11 (915).
Geiger v. Simpson Methodist Episcopal Church, 174 Minn. 389, 219 N. W. 463
(1928); Bruce v. Y. M. C. A., 51 Nev. 372, 277 Pac. 798 (1929); Hewett v. Woman's
Hosp. Aid Ass'n, 73 N. H. 556, 64 Atl. 19o (19o6); City of Shawnee v. Roush, ioi
Okla. 60, 223 Pac. 354 (1923); O'Neill v. Odd Fellows Home, 89 Ore. 382, 174 Pac.
148 (1918).
3
2 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 12o Mass. 432, 21
Am. Rep. 529
(1876).
"Some courts refuse to distinguish between a tort by an agent or servant and
one by the management itself. Bodenheimer v. Confederate Memorial Ass'n, 68 F.
(2d) 507 (C. C. A. 4 th, 1934), cert. denied, 292 U. S.629, 54 S. Ct. 643, 78 L. ed. 1483
(1934); Adams v. University Hosp., 122 Mo. App. 675, 99 S. W. 453 (1907); Schumacher v. Evangelical Deaconess Society, 218 Wis. 169, 260 N. W. 476 (1935).
Most of these cases follow the example of Massachusetts. Although the Massachusetti General Hospital case seemed to make it a requisite of exemption that the
officers or management be without negligence, it was later stated by the court in
Roosen v. Peter Bent Brigham Hosp., 235 Mass. 66, 126 N. E. 392, 394 (192o) that
the phrase "provided due case has been used in their selection" was "merely precautionary" and should not be "seized upon as a basis for the argument that such a
charitable corporation as a hospital should be held liable for the negligence of its
managing officers in selecting incompetent subordinate agents." Thus the Massachusetts rule has been extended so that at the present time in that jurisdiction a
charitable institution is absolutely exempt from all tort liability. Enman v. Trustees
of Boston Univ., 17o N. E. 43 (Mass. 1930).
'-As to liability to strangers and servants, see io Fletcher, Cyc. Corp. (Perm. Ed.
1931) §§ 4922, 4924.
24
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abolishing it.28 The method of the Colorado court is commendable,
although not entirely satisfactory. There, under the rule of qualified
immunity, no exemption from liability will be recognized unless the
entire assets of the institution are held for the benefit of the charity.
Thus, the court allows the action to be prosecuted to judgment and
execution to be levied on all property other than that held for the
charitable purposes.29 The disadvantage of this rule is that it is only
applicable in those jurisdictions which grant immunity on either public policy or the trust fund doctrine. Obviously, the decision includes
no answer to the implied waiver theory, nor to those cases refusing to
2'England v. Hosp. of Good Smaritan, 88 P. (2d) 227 (Cal. App. 1939) (patient
paid $25 per week, this amount being less than the average cost; court held for
plaintiff because no charity was extended to plaintiff, and further plaintiff had no
knowledge of alleged charitable nature of institution); Morton v. Savannah Hosp.,
148 Ga. 438, 96 S. E. 887 (1918) (if a charitable hospital treats patients for pay it is
liable to the extent of the income derived from the treatment of the paying patients);
Medical College v. Rushing, i Ga. App. 475, 57 S. E. 1083 (1907) (liable for the
mutilation of the corpse of a charity patient); Sessions v. Thomas Dee Memorial
Hosp., 51 P. (ad) 229 (Utah 1935) (a charity receiving patient for pay owes the duty
of due care and is liable for the failure to exercise that care).
Some of the later cases, especially in England, have determined the question of
liability upon the principle of what the hospital actually undertakes to do. Under
this principle the question in each case would be (i) whether or not there is an express contract which can furnish the measure of duty and liability; (a) if not, what
the hospital holds itself out as undertaking to perform. In the latter event liability
will depend on whether or not the medical staff are paid attendants furnished by
the hospital, or whether they are merely attached to the hospital as consultants.
Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew's Hosp., [199o] 2 K. B. 820, 829, 9 B. R. C. 1, io: "The
governors of a public hospital, by their admission of the patient to enjoy gratuitous
benefit ... undertake that the patient shall be treated only by experts... and further, that those experts shall have at their disposal fit and proper apparatus and
appliances ...
" Hamburger v. Cornell Univ., 24o N. Y. 328, 148 N. E. 539, 542
(1923): "With us a hospital or university owes to patients or to students whatever
duty of care and diligence is attached to the relation as reasonably implicit in the
nature of the undertaking and the purpose of the charity."
2OSt. Mary's Academy v. Solomon, 77 Co1. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925). The Supreme
Court of Tennessee has also adopted the rule of the Colorado courts. McLeod v. St.
Thomas Hosp., 17o Tenn. 423, 95 S. V. (2d) 917, 919 (1936): "The exemption and
protection afforded to a charitable institution is not immunity from suit, not nonliability for a tort, but that the protection actually given is to the trust funds themselves. It is a recognition that such funds cannot be seized upon by execution, nor
appropriated to the satisfaction of a tort liability. And certainly it is no defense to
a tort action, that the defendant has no property subject to execution." This case
was followed by Vanderbilt Univ. v. Henderson, 127 S. W. (2d) 284, 287 (Tenn. App.
1938): ". . . this [McLeod case] . . is a recognition that a charitable institution is
liable for a tort of its agent and may be pursued to judgment; but that the institution's trust property cannot be taken to satisfy such judgment; and that where
such institution has liability insurance, such insurance is not trust property of the
institution and may be appropriated to the satisfaction of such judgment."
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apply respondeat superior to charitable institutions. Furthermore, in
most cases all of the property of the institution is used for the purposes
of the charity. Only in a rare instance will property exist which a court
can hold to be free from an imposition in the nature of a trust.3 0
The one form of property that would be free from such an imposition is liability insurance. Unfortunately, under the rule of the majority of jurisdictions such insurance is ineffectual. The ordinary liability insurance policy is an indemnity policy limiting payment by the
insurer to those instances in which there has been a judgment against
the insured. Therefore, if the institution is not liable in tort to a beneficiary, the mere fact that it is the owner of a policy of liability insurance will not make it so.31 This is an entirely reasonable and logical
conclusion in those jurisdictions which hold to the rule of absolute
nonliability to beneficiaries. It is entirely unreasonable in those jurisdictions which hold to the rule of qualified liability, and has been so
recognized. 32 Thus, if the rule of the Colorado case is adopted, that
a charitable institution is liable in tort as any other institution or corporation, but that the liability may not be satified from the trust property, there is no reason why the judgment may not be satisfied from the
liability insurance policy. Under such a rule the injured beneficiary is
recompensed, the trust property is saved harmless, and the insurer is
not escaping the risk which it has been paid to bear.
Of course the Colorado rule is of temporary value only. It is a simple matter to write insurance policies excluding beneficiaries of the insured charities. Nevertheless, it is a step in what is submitted to be the
proper direction-the complete abolition of the rule of nonliability.
The rule was established for reasons of policy which no longer exist. In
an earlier day, benevolence of this type was administered almost entirely by private individuals and institutions. They were few and they
were poor, and it was entirely just that they be given such an exemption
nIri Gamble v. Vanderbilt Univ., 138 Tenn. 616, 200 S. W. 510 (1918), where a
building owned by defendant was operated at a profit, the profits being used for the
charitable purpose, plaintiff was allowed to recover from the rents and profits, such
liability
being incident to the operation of the building.
31Levy v. Superior Court, 74 Cal. App. 171, 239 Pac. 1100 (1925); William's Adm'x
v. Church Home for Females, 223 Ky. 355, 3 S. W. (2d) 753 (1928); Enman v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 17o N. E. 43 (Mass. 193o); Mississippi Baptist Hosp. v. Moore,
156 Miss. 676, 126 So. 465 (193o); Greatrex v. Evangelical Deaconess Hosp., 261 Mich.
327, 246 N. W. 137 (1933).
,O'Connor v. Boulder Colorado Sanitarium Ass'n, 96 P. (2d) 835 (Colo. 1939);
Brown v. St. Luke's Hosp. Ass'n, 85 Colo. 167, 274 Pac. 740 (1929); St. Mary's Academy
v. Solomon, 77 Colo. 463, 238 Pac. 22 (1925); McLeod v. St. Thomas Hosp., 17o Tenn.
423, 95 S. W. (2d) 917 (1936).
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as an aid and an encouragement. But today, a quickened moral and
social sense and an increased national wealth have led to a tremendous
expansion of endowed charitable institutions, to government subsidies
to such institutions, and to outright government operation and maintenance of such institutions. Furthermore, the steadily advancing trend
has been to spread the normal risks present in every activity among as
great a number of people as possible, the most obvious manifestation
of this trend being the growth of the large insurance companies. In
view of these facts the exemption of charitable institutions from tort
liability stands as an anachronism in Anglo-American law, peculiarly
vicious in that it thrusts the entire risk of harm on those persons least
BRYC E,
ii.
able to bear it-those forced to accept charity.33

CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-FoURTEENTH AMENDMENT "PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES" CLAUSE AS A LIMITATION UPON STATE TAXING POWR.

[United States Supreme Court]
The protection afforded a federal citizen by the Fourteenth Amendment "privileges or immunities" clause, 1 extended by the 1935 decision
of Colgate v. Harvey,2 has again been restricted by the Supreme Court
in the case of Madden v. Kentucky3 to accord with the interpretation
4
first given that clause in 1873 by the Slaughter-House Cases.
uHarper, Law of Torts (1933) § 294: "The policy of the law requiring individuals to be just before generous seems equally applicable to charitable corporations.
To require an injured individual to forego compensation for harm when he is otherwise entitled thereto, because the injury was committed by the servants of the
charity, is to require him to make an unreasonable contribution to the charity
against his will, and a rule of law imposing such burdens cannot be regarded as
socially desirable nor consistent with sound policy." The recent trend to liability is
shown by Sheehan v. North Country Community Hosp., 273 N. Y. 63, 7 N. E. (2d)
28, 29 (1937). After rejecting the waiver theory as a fiction the court says: "To impose
liability is to beget careful management.... No conception of justice demands that
an exception to the rule of respondeat superior be made." And see Note, Tort Liability of Charitable Institutions in New York (1939) 9 Brooklyn L. Rev. 78.
1U. S. Const. Amend. 14, § x: "No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States...." It is
to be noted that Art. 4, § 2 of the original Constitution reads: "The Citizens of each
State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States." (Italics supplied.)
2295 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, So L. ed. 299, 102 A. L. R. 54 (x935).
16o S. Ct. 406, 8 U. S. L. Week 201 (1940). The case has been discussed in (i94o)
53 Harv. L. Rev. 874; (1940) 38 Mich. L. Rev. 720; (1940) 24 Minn. L. Rev. 691; (1940)
88 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 621.
'16 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I

A Kentucky statute 5 imposed on its citizens an annual ad valorem
tax on deposits in banks outside of the state at the rate of fifty cents
per hundred dollars and at the same time imposed on deposits in banks
located within the state a similar ad valorem tax at the rate of ten cents
per hundred dollars. A Kentucky citizen and resident maintained deposits in New York banks, but had not reported these deposits on several prior assessment dates for the purposes of taxation. At his death
and when the estate was settled, the state brought suit to have these deposits assessed as omitted property and to recover the tax. The taxpayer
(estate) attacked the constitutionality of the tax on the grounds that it
violated the due process, equal protection, and privileges or immunities
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky sustained the legislation, and on appeal, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Reed, affirmed the decision.
The due process and equal protection objections were dismissed on the
grounds that the classification for the imposition of the tax was not
hostile to or oppressively discriminating against particular persons and
classes. 6 On the privileges and immunities objection, the Court held
that the right to carry on business beyond the lines of the state of residence was not a federal privilege or immunity protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision in the Madden case will probably put an end to the
controversy provoked by Colgate v. Harvey.7 In that case a Vermont
statute,8 imposing income taxes on interest bearing securities, exempted from the tax, income from money loaned within the state at
less than 5 %o interest. In an action attacking the constitutionality of the
statute brought by a citizen of Vermont, the Supreme Court held the
tax invalid seemingly on two grounds: first, that the exemption of
money loaned within"the state was a denial of equal protection because
the classification had no reasonable relation to the purpose of the taxthe raising of revenue; and secondly, that aside from this, the discrimination against loans made outside the state was an infringement of the
5Carroll's Kentucky Statutes, Baldwin's Revision (193o) § 4019a-io.
OAs stated by the Court, a state tax statute is presumed constitutional unless it

is proved that there is no conceivable basis to support it. Here the classification "may
have been founded in the purposes and policy of taxation . . . may have resulted
from the differences in the difficulties and expenses of tax collection." 6o S. Ct. 406,
409, 8 U. S. L. Week 201, 202 (1940).
¢296 U. S. 404, 56 S. Ct. 252, 8o L. ed. 299, 102 A. L. R. 54
Pub. Laws of Vt. (1933) § 872 et seq.

(1935).
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federal privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the majority, held as falling among
federal privileges or immunities, "the right of a citizen to engage in
business... or to make a lawful loan of money in any state other than
that in which the citizen ...

resides."' 10 To this opinion Mr. Justice

Reed in the principal case makes dynamic reply: "We think it quite
clear that the right to carry out an incident to a trade, business or calling such as the deposit of money in banks is not a privilege of national
dtizenship."-" The "right to carry on business beyond the lines of the
State of ... residence" is not a privilege or immunity appertaining to,
national citizenship. "In view of our conclusions, we look upon the decision in... [Colgate v. Harvey] as repugnant to the line of reasoning
adopted here. As a consequence, Colgatev. Harvey must be and is overruled."' 2
It had been supposed, prior to the case of Colgate v. Harvey in
1935, that the federal privileges or immunities clause had lost significance as a method of federal control over state action.' 3 This was a
9
At least one writer felt that the case was not decided on the equal protection
clause at all, but on the privileges or immunities clause alone. See Howard, The
Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87
U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 273 note 56. The overruling of Colgate v. Harvey by Madden v.
Kentucky, as the Court explained in the latter case, was to the extent that it was
repugnant to the line of reasoning adopted in the Madden case. If the Colgate case
was decided on the equal protection objection as well as the privileges and immunities objection, certainly the result on the equal protection point in the two cases
differs. It seems apparent in both cases, however, that the Justices agree on the fundamental issue that a tax does not have to be imposed equally on all if the classification is one bearing a reasonable relation to the purpose for which the tax is imposed. See 296 U. S. 404, 423, 56 S. Ct. 252, 256, 102 A. L. R. 54, 61, and 6o S. Ct. 406,
408, 8. U. S. L. Week 2o, 2o2. The deciding of this question is in a large degree subjective, and not too much significance can be given to the final determination in
each case. (1936) 45 Yale L. J. 926, 927, 928; Sutherland, J.'s dissent in State Bd. of
Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U. S. 527, 550, 51 S. Ct. 540, 548 (1931). The Court
in the instant case, however, by emphasizing the "hands-off" policy of presuming the
validity of the legislation, seems to arrive at the more desirable conclusion.
It is felt that the real significance of the Colgate v. Harvey-Madden v. Kentucky
controversy lies in the disposition of the privileges or immunities clause. This aspect
of the case alone is considered in the present discussion.
2°Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 4 o4,4 3o, 56 S. Ct. 252, 259, 102 A. L. R. 54, 66 (1935).
"Madden v. Kentucky, 6o S. Ct. 4o6, 41o, 8 U. S. L. Week 201, 203 (194o).
I-Madden v. Kentucky, 6o S. Ct. 406, 411, 8 U. S. L. Week 2o, 203 (194o). Mr.
Justice Roberts, joined by Mr. Justice McReynolds, dissented, adhering to the rule
of Colgate v. Harvey. Mr. Justice Hughes concurred in the result on the ground that
the classification was on a reasonable basis.

"See dissent of Stone, J., in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 443, 56 S. Ct.

252,

265, 1o2 A. L. R. 54, 73 (1935); and in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 520, 59 S. Ct.
954, 966 (1939); Brannon. The Fourteenth Amendment (19o) 56 et seq.; Cooley, Gen-
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direct result of its first interpretation in the Slaughter-House Cases.14
It was there held that the chief purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment
was to give the negro national citizenship and to insure his rights as a
national citizen,15 but not to vary "the delicate balance" between state
and national powers. Mr. Justice Miller, speaking for the majority, observed that in spite of the "excited feeling growing out of the War" and
the sentiment for a strong national government it was essential that the
states should have "powers for domestic and local government, including the regulation of civil rights-the rights of person and of property,"
rights not inherent in national citizenship, but in state citizenship.' 6
As rights of state citizenship, they could not be given federal protection
17
by the privileges or immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This clause was subsequently held to protect only those privileges and
eral Principles of Constitutional Law (1880) 245 et seq.; i Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929) 241, 248; Howard, The Privileges and
Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
262, 267 et seq.; Morris, What Are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the
United States? (1921) 28 W. Va. L. Q. 38.
116 Wall. 36 (U. S. 1873).
21In this case white citizens in the slaughter-house industry were attacking a
Louisiana statute which affected the place and manner of conducting their business.
"OIt appears that the privileges or immunities clause is now understood as not
having been intended to create new rights in federal citizens, but to secure existing
federal citizenship rights to the newly-made citizens. See the language of Mr. Justice
Roberts in Hague v. CIO, 397 U. S. 496, 512 ,59 S. Ct. 954, 962 (1939); Orr v. Gilman,
183 U. S. 278, 286, 22 S. Ct. 213, 216 (1902); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 1o S.
Ct. 930, 934 (1890); Ex parte Virginia, 1oo U. S. 339, 365 (1879); Minor v. Hapersett,
21 Wall. 162, 171 (1874). The dissents in the Slaughter-House Cases indicate a strong
feeling that it was really this issue over which the War had been fought, and that
it was the intent of the framers of the Amendment to create a much stronger national government with greater power of control over state governments. SlaughterHouse Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 97, 100-101, 129 (U. S. 1873); Burdick, Law of the American Constitution (1922) § 116; Corwin, The Constitution and What It Means Today (6th ed. 1938) 171; (1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 935, 936. The rights, privileges and
immunities held to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment were, therefore,
those considered "fundamental," those belonging "of right to every free citizen of a
civilizeff government." Slaughter-House Cases dissent, 16 Wall. 36, 97 (1873); 1 Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929) 239; Morris,
What Are the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the United States? (1921) 28
W. Va. L. Q. 38. This idea continued in the dissents of the privileges and immunities cases until the due process clause of the same Amendment began to take over the
field of federal protection of fundamental substantive civil rights against abridgment
by the state governments. For a description of this process, see Warren, The New
"Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431. Also see I
Willoughby, The Constitutional Law of the United States (2d ed. 1929) 243; Borchard.
The Supreme Court and Private Rights (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1051, 1057; Corwin, The
Supreme Court and the Fourteenth Amendment (19o9) 7 Mich. L. Rev. 643; Note
(1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 490, 498.
"Quoted from the Slaughter-House Cases opinion: "Having shown that the
privileges and immunities relied on in the argument are those which belong to citi-
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immunities which "arise out of the nature and essential character of
the national government, or are specifically granted or secured to all
citizens or persons by the United States Constitution,"1 s "or its laws
and treaties made in pursuance thereof."19 Until the case of Colgate v.
Harvey, not one of forty-seven cases20 reaching the Supreme Court on
claim of violations of the clause was successful in establishing that fed21
eral privileges and immunities were infringed by state action.
zens of the States as such, and that they are left to the State Governments for security
and protection, and not by this article placed under the special care of the Federal
government, we may hold ourselves excused from defining the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States which no citizen can abridge, until some
case involving those privileges may make it necessary to do so .. " 16 Wall. 36,
78-79 (U. S. 1873). The doctrines of denying protection under the Fourteenth Amendment privileges or immunities clause to fundamental civil rights is somewhat without purpose in light of the fact that all persons including national citizens now have
protection against a state's unreasonable abridgment of "fundamental substantive
civil rights" under the due process of law clause of the same Amendment. See criticlsms of this development by Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private Rights
(1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1051, 1057; Warren, The New "Liberty" Under the Fourteenth
o,
Amendment (1926) 39 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 462; Note (1938) 7 Brooklyn L. Rev. 49
495-496, 498 note 52.
18Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.78, 97, 29 S. Ct. 14, 19 (1908); Orr v. Gilman,
183 U. S.278, 286, 22 S. Ct. 213, 217 (1902); Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U. S.377, 382,
14 S. Ct. 570, 571-572 (1894); In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 10 S. Ct. 930, 934
(189o). Nor were the guarantees of the first eight amendments considered "privileges
and immunities of United States citizenship" under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S.78, 98, 99, 29 S. Ct. 14, 19 (19o8); Maxwell v. Dow,
176 U. S. 581, 595, 20 S. Ct. 448, 454 (19oo); Burdick, Law of the American Constitution (1922) § 117; McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment (1918) 4 Iowa L. Bull. 219, 2 Selected Essays on Constitutional Law (1938) 402.
'9McPhrso V._lacker, 146 U. S. 1, 38, 13 S.Ct. 3, 11 (1892). Also see Twining v.
New Jersey, 211 U. S. 77, 97, 29 S. Ct. 14, 19 (19o8); Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U. S. 245, 261, 55 S. Ct. 197, 203 (1934)21The cases are collected in Mr. Justice Stone's dissent in Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U. S. 404, 445, 56 S.Ct. 252, 266, 102 A. L. R. 54, 74 (1935), and additions are made
in his specially concurring opinion in Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S.496, 521, 59 S. Ct. 954,
967 (1939). Mr. Justice Stone listed forty-four cases in Colgate v. Harvey, and added
three more in Hague v. CIO which had arisen before the Colgate decision. Also see
McGovney, Privileges or Immunities Clause, Fourteenth Amendment (1918) 4 Iowa
L. Bull. 219, 2 Selected Essays in Constitutional Law (1938) 402, 4o5. Some of the
rights claimed were: to practice law in a state court, to vote, to sell or possess liquor,
to use the American flag for advertising purposes, to obtain dower rights, to graze
sheep on the public domain, or to attend a state university. An extensive listing is
made by Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate
v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 270-272.
"There was little support for holding the making of investments in other
states without deterrence by the state of origin a right so peculiar as to be a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship, and thereby to differ from rights protected
under the interstate commerce, due process, and equal protection clauses. See Mr.
Justice Stone's dissent to Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S.404, 445, 56 S. Ct. 252, 266, 102
A. L. R. 54, 73-74 (1935); Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizen-
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It was not made clear in the Colgate opinion whether the difference
in the tax imposed on money loaned within the state and that imposed
on money loaned without was considered an infringement of a federal
privilege or immunity because merely discriminatory, or whether it
was the arbitrary and unreasonable character of the discrimination that
was considered an infringement.22 If mere discrimination was the basis
of the decision, the clause was being used to extend federal protection
over citizens beyond the protection afforded in the other clauses of the
Constitution 23 and, as Mr. Justice Stone saw, with the result of increasship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262. In Williams v. Fears, 179
U. S. 270, 21 S. Ct. 128 (0oo), a state occupation tax on those engaged in hiring
laborers for work outside the state was held not to infringe the federal privileges or
immunities clause. In Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553, 27 S. Ct. 171 (19o6)
a state inheritance tax statute which limited exemptions to charitable corporations
within the state was held not to infringe any rights protected by the privileges or
immunities clause. That statutes tending to interfere with interstate transactions do
not violate rights peculiarly inherent in national citizenship is further indicated by
the case of Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 49 S. Ct. 279 (1929).
Crandall v. Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1867) held that the right to travel through states on
the way to the seat of the national government was a privilege of federal citizenship
and that a state capitation tax on such a privilege was unconstitutional. In Railroad
Co. v. Maryland, 21 Wall. 456, 472 (1874), the same type of state action was considered
simply a violation of the commerce clause. The Helson and Randolph case went
further and stated that in so far as Crandall v. Nevada made the right to pass from
one state into another a privilege or immunity of federal citizenship rather than a
right protected by the commerce clause, it had not been followed. Helson and Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 251, 49 S. Ct. 279, 281 (1929). Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U. S. 404, 444, 56 S. Ct. 252, 266 (1935), dissent of Stone, J.
The carrying on of business between states such as the issuing of foreign bonds
of exchange and insurance policies, and lending money is not interstate commerce.
Nathan v. Louisiana, 8 How. 73 (U. S. 1850); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S.
1868); Nelms v. Edinburg-American Land Mortgage Co., 92 Ala. 157, 9 So. 141 (1891).
Even if it were, however, a tax on net income derived from interstate commerce is
not a burden on such commerce. U. S. Glue Co. v. Town of Oak Creek, 247 U. S.
321, 38 S. Ct. 499, 62 L. ed. 1135 (1918); Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U. S. 37, 40 S. Ct. 221,
64 L. ed. 445 (1920); Colgate v. Harvey, dissent of Stone, J., 296 U. S. 404, 448, 56
S. Ct. 252, 268, 102 A. L. R. 54, 76 (1935). States have been allowed to foster domestic
industries by the exercise of their taxing power. Magnano v. Hamilton, 292 U. S. 40,
54 S. Ct. 599, 78 L. ed. 1109 (1934); Alaska Fish Co. v. Smith, 255 U. S. 44, 41 S. Ct.
219 (1921). Where there has been "neither an invidious discrimination nor a burden
on interstate commerce, as that clause is usually construed, this favoring of domestic
interest rates would seem to be a permissible public aim." (1936) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
506, 507.
=Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 447, 56 S. Ct. 252, 267, io2 A. L. R. 54, 75
(1935), dissent of Stone, J.; Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 277; (1936) 49 Harv.
L. Rev. 935.
2The fact of discrimination alone does not violate the interstate commerce clause
even conceding that interstate business was commerce. See supra, note 21. The equal
protection and due process clauses apply only where a tax discrimination is hostile
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ing federal judicial control over state action "sufficient to cause serious
24
apprehension for the rightful independence of local government." If
it was the unreasonable and arbitrary feature of the discrimination that
formed the basis for the application of the clause, it would seem to add
nothing to the guarantee of the equal protection clause, which extends
to "persons," as well as to "citizens." 25 Because of the Court's further
decision that the exemption of dividends derived from corporate business in the state and non-exemption of the same type of dividends from
without the state was not an infringement of the clause, 26 it appears
that the majority's conception was that the clause was thought to prohibit only those inequalities in taxation considered arbitrary and unreasonable. If so, the same result could have been reached by the same
27
judges through the equal protection clause alone.
Legal commentators were confused by the decision and explanations
advanced were varied. Some writers suggested that, if the clause was
being extended beyond the equal protection clause, emphasis was upon
strengthening the concept of a unified national society by removal of
state barriers to interstate activity; 28 some thought it may have been an
avoidance of the restricted construction of the interstate commerce
clause, 29 or to give to interstate business which is not commerce the
80
same protection given interstate commerce by the commerce clause.
or arbitrary and unreasonable with respect to the purpose of the tax. Rottschaefer,
Constitutional Law (1939) §§ 284-286 and cases there cited.
2
Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 447, 56 S. Ct. 252, 267, 102 A. L. R. 54, 75
(x935); Howard, The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v.
Harvey (1939) 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 277. The same idea was expressed in the
Slaughter-House Cases, i6 Wall. 36, 77, 78 (U. S. 1873).
-Since a corporation is a "person," but not a "citizen" within the meaning of
the Fourteenth Amendment, Western Turf Association v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359,
363, 27 S. Ct. 384, 386 (19o7); Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 561, 19
S. Ct. 281, 282 (1899), the privileges or immunities clause ostensibly does not benefit
corporate business.
=Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U. S. 404, 450, 56 S. Ct. 252, 268-269, 102 A. L. R. 54, 77
(1935).
- Quoting from Mr. Justice Stone's specially concurring opinion in Hague v.
CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 525, 59 S. Ct. 954, 968 (1939): "If it be the part of wisdom to avoid
unnecessary decision of constitutional questions, it would seem to be equally so to
avoid the unnecessary creation of novel constitutional doctrine . . . in order to
attain an end easily and certainly reached by following the beaten paths of constitutional decision." See Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Authority, 297 U. S. 288, 346-347,
56 S. Ct. 466, 483 (1936), Mr. Justice Brandeis' second and third "canon of interpretation."
3(1936) 49 Harv. L. Rev. 95; (1936) 30 111. L. Rev. 953; (1936) 84 U. of Pa. L.
Rev. 655.
(1936) 3 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 5o6.
3(1 936) 20 Minn. L. Rev. 549.
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While one saw in it a further protection of personal liberty against social control,31 another feared the imperiling of democratic institutions
by denying to the states the social control over economic enterprise formerly permitted them.3 2 Among other suggestions: an expression of a
laissez-faire desire to permit commercial endeavor to locate in the most
favorable economic site,33 the Court's revival and expansion of a third
device in the Federal Government's arsenal of methods to review and
censure state action,3 4 and the beginning of a reversion to the fundamental rights theory as argued in the Slaughter-House Cases dissents. 3 5
The general opinion among the writers36 was adversely critical and
in support of the dissent.T
In spite of this controversy, Colgate v. Harvey did not seriously affect federal court litigation. In one case only did the privileges and immunities contention again appear to be upheld.3 8 In Hague v. C10 39
where unincorporated labor organizations and individuals were seeking to restrain the mayor and government of Jersey City from interfering with their union functions, Mr. Justice Roberts, with Mr. Justice Black concurring, wrote the first of the majority opinions, 40 in
Ind. L. J. 39o.
The Privileges and Immunities of Federal Citizenship and Colgate v.
87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 278-279.
Col. L. Rev. 669.
Mich. L. Rev. 1034.
3(1936) 24 Calif. L. Rev. 728.
3Among other discussions: (1956) 14 N. C. L. Rev. 282; (1936) 13 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Rev. 496; (1936) 14 Tex. L. Rev. 548; (1936) 11 Wis. L. Rev. 434; (1936) 45 Yale L. J.
926.
9=Typical objections are found in Howard, The
Privileges and Immunities of
87
U.
of Pa. L. Rev. 262, 277: "The
Federal Citizenship and Colgate v. Harvey (1939)
most disquieting aspect of Colgate v. Harvey . . . is its uncertain scope," and in
(1936) 36 Col. L. Rev. 669: "The decision is an unfortunate introduction to a new
area of constitutional uncertainty, in which the judiciary may romp between the
lines of inclusion and exclusion." But cf. Borchard, The Supreme Court and Private
Rights (1938) 47 Yale L. J. 1051, 1o63.
84
I n 'one case, however, Asher v. Ingels, 13 F. Supp. 654, 658 (S. D. Cal. 1936),
Colgate v. Harvey was hesitantly cited for its dictum that "The right to transact a
lawful business is a privilege of national citizenship." The case was decided on the
interstate commerce, due process, and equal protection of laws clauses, however, and
no semblance of the privileges and immunities objection again appeared in the
opinion. In Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U. S. 431, 56 S. Ct. 532, 8o L. ed. 778 (1936), the
federal privileges or immunities clause was rejected as without substance, since in
that case its effect would have been the same as Article 4 § 2 of the Constitution
which "is directed against discrimination by a state in favor of its own citizens and
against the citizens of other states." Colgate v. Harvey was otherwise cited in various
cases, but in the main for its equal protection dictum.
3307 U. S. 496, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939)'0 For a discussion of the line-up of the Justices in this case and the implication
3'(1936) 11
3
2Howard,
Harvey (1939)
3(1936) 36
3'(1936) 34
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which it was considered a privilege or immunity of national citizenship
to enjoy "freedom to disseminate information concerning the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act, to assemble peaceably for
discussion of the Act, and of the opportunities and advantages offered
by it .... 41 It is perhaps significant that Mr. Justice Roberts did not
call on Colgate v. Harvey to support his case. On the other hand he may
have felt that the particular privileges infringed in the two cases were
of too different a nature to afford an analogy. It does seem on principle
that such a right as the one upheld in the Hague case could validly be
a privilege of federal citzenship, even within the accepted interpreta42
tion of the privileges or immunities clause prior to Colgate v. Harvey.
Nevertheless Mr. Justice Stone, in a specially concurring opinion, approved by Mr. Justice Reed, again delivered an attack on the extension
of the privileges and immunities principle strikingly similar to the one
delivered in Colgate v. Harvey. Again he pointed out the futility of
using a historically dead clause, as was done in that case, to achieve a
result which wds completely capable of being reached by the due process clause alone. 43 Quite evidently Mr. Justice Stone felt that this exof the opinion with respect to "freedom of opinion" cases, see Johnson, Post-War
Protection of Freedom of Opinion (1940) i Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 192, 199-201.
"Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S. 496, 512, 59 S.Ct. 954, 962 (1939).
' 2Dissent of Brandeis, J.,in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U. S. 325, 337-8, 41 S. Ct.
125, 129 (1920): "The right to speak freely concerning functions of the Federal Government is a privilege or immunity of every citizen of the United States which, even
before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment a State was powerless to curtail.
... The right of a citizen ... to take part ... in the making of federal laws ... ,
necessarily includes the right to speak or write about them.... Were this not so
'The right of the people peaceably to assemble for purpose of petitioning Congress
for a redress of grievances, .. .' would be a right totally without substance." In the
Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79 (U. S.1873): "The right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
are rights of the citizen guaranteed by the Federal Constitution." These rights were
likewise considered under the privileges or immunities clause in U. S. v. Cruickshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552, 553 (1875). Mr. Justice Stone, however, felt that the step
from the above statement to holding "the right to assemble and discuss the advantages of the National Labor Relations Act" a similar privilege, was a "long and
by no means certain one." Hague v. CIO, 307 U. S.496, 522, 59 S. Ct. 954, 967 (1939).
I'Mr. Justice Roberts apparently held that because the rights infringed were
privileges and immunities of national citizenship jurisdiction was conferred by Jud.
Code § 24 (1) and (14), 28 U. S. C. A. § 41 (1)and (14) which require no averment or
proof that the amount in controversy exceeds $3ooo. Mr. Justice Stone, citing the same
provisions of the statute, held that the right to maintain an equity suit to restrain
state officers, acting under a state law, from infringing the rights of freedom of speech
and of assembly guaranteed by the due process clause, is given by Congress to all
persons whether citizens or not.
Mr. Justice Stone's reasons for preferring the use of the due process clause were:
(a) the extension of the privileges or immunities clause, and reversion to the fundamental rights doctrine argued in the Slaughter-House dissents, is a danger to the
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tension was along the same lines as that in Colgate v. Harvey.4 4 In spite
of this fact, however, it cannot be said that the opinion of Mr. Justice
Roberts in Hague v. CIO is in any way affected by the overruling of
Colgate v. Harvey since the claimed privileges and immunities were of
such different nature in the two cases. It is only in the interpretation
propounded by Mr. Justice Stone that a: conflict is found in the cases.
Nevertheless it is not difficult to foresee that henceforth litigants will
feel safer in considering the "privileges or immunities" clause of very
dubious assistance even in freedom of opinon cases, and will base their
arguments on the specially concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Stone in
Hague v. CIO rather than on Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion.
It seems evident that Madden v. Kentucky in no uncertain terms
has again limited the privileges or immunities clause as a "device in
the Federal Government's arsenal of methods to review and censure
state action." 45 Once more the clause will probably go into repose to be
brought out, as in the days prior to Colgate v. Harvey, only by those
litigants seeking protection for vague and uncertain privileges which
find no specific protection in other clauses of the Constitution. If, as
now seems likely, the clause is back where it was before the Colgate decision, its "panacea-like" language will again be held to afford little relief to such applicants. That the fate of the clause is settled gains
weight with the consideration that the Colgate v. Harvey effort to vary
the long-accepted doctrine of the Slaughter-House Cases was tolerated
FrED BARTEN smN, JR.
by the Supreme Court for less than five years.
independence of local government; (b) an unnecessary creation of novel constitutional
doctrine; (c) the record could not support the decree under the privileges or immunities clause since the plaintiff did not aver nor prove that he was a citizen; (d)
a decree based on the privileges or immunities clause would have to be so narrow as
to affect only the relation between the defendant and the national government, that
is, it would have to be restricted to the dissemination of information concerning the
National Labor Relations Act alone, rather than to the dissemination of any lawful
information.
"Mr. Justice Stone: "I do not doubt that the decree ... is rightly affirmed, but I
am unable to follow the path by which some of my brethren have attained that end.
..." 307 U. S. 496, 518, 59 S. Ct. 954, 965 (1939). It was evident that it was not solely
precedent that prompted this position. Rather it seems that the mere use of this
clause in the two cases represented to Justices Stone and Reed'the advent of a dangerous device. This is apparent from the further language: ".. . resort to the privileges
and immunities clause . . . would involve constitutional experimentation as gratuitous as it is unwarranted. We cannot be sure that its consequences would not be unfortunate." 307 U. S.496, 532, 59 S. Ct. 954, 971 (1939)- For a possible method by
which "federal privileges and immunities," as so extended, could have eventually
been used for the benefit of all persons as well as United States citizens, see (1936)
24 Calif. L. Rev. 728, 732.
'5('9a 6 ) 34 Mich. L. Rev. 1034, 1037.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY; HABEAS CORPUS-USE OF WRIT TO SECURE RELEASE
FROM IMPRISONMENT AFTER CONVICTION UNDER UNCONSTITUTIONAL

STATUTE. [United States Supreme Court and New Jersey]

The problem of whether a judicial determination of constitutionality is to be given retrospective as well as prospective effect continues to
confront state and federal courts. In Chicot County Drainage District
v. Baxter State Bank' the United States Supreme Court refused to allow
collateral attack upon a judgment reached in a civil proceeding approving a municipal debt reorganization plan, where the statute under
which the proceeding had been undertaken was later declared unconstitutional. In Ex parte Connellan2 the New Jersey Supreme Court permitted collateral attack, by way of habeas corpus, upon a judgment
of conviction in a prosecution arising under an Act which subsequent
to the prisoner's conviction had been held unconstitutional. Though
the two cases at first glance appear to be in conflict, an examination of
the two situations involved may well indicate that a complete reconciliation is possible on practical grounds.
In the Chicot County case the defendant was a drainage district
organized under the laws of Arkansas, with power to issue bonds. In
1932 defendant defaulted on its obligation to pay the bonds and later,
proceeding under the Municipal-Debt Readjustment Act,3 filed a petition for readjustment of its debts. The plaintiff, a bondholder, was
given full notice of the proceedings but did not contest the reorganization. Money was left in the hands of the court for one year for those
bondholders who did not immediately join in the reorganization, but
the plaintiff did not redeem his bonds within that time. Subsequently,
the Municipal-Debt Readjustment Act was held unconstitutional by
the Supreme Court in Ashton v. Cameron County District.4 The plaintiff thereafter sued to recover on his old bonds, arguing that since the
statute on which the reorganization was based had been invalidated,
the reorganization itself was of no effect. The Supreme Court rejected
the contention and held that the plaintiff, having failed to raise the
question of the validity of the reorganization in the proceedings to
which it was a party, and in which the issue could properly have been
presented and decided, was now prevented by the bar of res judicata
16o S. Ct. 317 (1940). Rehearing denied, 60 S. Ct. 581 (1940).
123 N. J. L. 229, 8 A. (2d) 345 (1939).

2

348 Stat. 798 (1934), 11 U. S. C. A. §§ 3oi-3o3 (1937).
'298 U. S. 513, 56 S. Ct. 892, 8o L. ed. i3og (1936).
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from raising it in a subsequent collateral attack on the judgment.
Plaintiff had further contended that the district court, being one of
limited jurisdiction conferred by the Act, was deprived of jurisdiction
by virtue of the invalidation of the statute. In answer to this argument
the Supreme Court declared that, though the district court's jurisdiction was limited, yet it had authority to determine whether it had jurisdiction when parties were properly before it; and, while the determination so made was open to direct review, it could not be attacked in a collateral action.
The decisions supporting the result of the Chicot County case are
based on one of two general grounds: first, that the judgment rendered
under the subsequently invalidated statute is voidable, not void, and
thus not subject to collateral attack, or second, that the bar of res
judicata applies to any subsequent action brought attacking the judgment, although the statute upon which the decision was based has been
declared unconstitutional.
The first ground is set out in a dictum in Hanchett Bond Go. v.
Morris.5 The court cited the general rule to the effect that a judgment
on the merits under an unconstitutional statute was not void, but
merely voidable, and was binding on the parties to the action when it
became final, even though at a later date the statute upon which the
proceedings were based was held unconstitutional. Although this pronouncement was dictum, it was later adopted by the court as proper
reasoning in two cases, 6 and practically the same reasoning was relied
7
upon in a decision in another jurisdiction.
The second ground is set out in State v. Trustees of Milwaukee
County Orphans' Board.8 The statute involved provided that after
certain debts were paid, all the personal property of persons in Milwaukee County dying intestate and without heirs should be turned
over to the Orphans' Board as part of its trust fund instead of escheating to the state. The statute was held unconstitutional, 9 and the state
sued t'o recover the money that had been turned over to the Orphans'
Board while the statute was in force. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
refused the state's claims, holding that the decisions of the county court
in settling these estates were res judicata as to the state, since there had
5143

Okla. 11o, 287 Pac. 1o25, 1026 (1930).

OJones v. McGrath, 16o Okla. 211, 16 P. (2d) 853 (1932); Walker v. Stubblefield,
167 Okla. 5o, 27 P. (2d) 1043 (1933).
TBeck et al. v. State, 196 Wis. 242, 219 N. W. 197 (1928).
8218 Wis. 518, 261 N. W. 676 (1935).
9In re Payne's Estate, 2o8 Wis. 142, 242 N. W. 553 (1932).
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been sufficient notice given by the court to all parties interested when
it published notices of the various administration proceedings in the
newspapers.O
Turning to the New Jersey case of Ex parte Connellan,": it appears
that a judicial declaration of unconstitutionality is given a different
effect. By this decision the court in habeas corpus proceedings ordered
the release of a man who had been imprisoned upon a conviction under
the New Jersey "Gangster Act"' 2 which after his conviction but prior
to the filing of the petition for habeas corpus had been held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States.' 3 On the basis of
New Jersey precedents' 4 the prisoner was held to be "illegally restrained
of his liberty." A line of cases arising under the same circumstances had
already been decided by the New Jersey court, Ex parte Rose' 5 being
the first decision. There the court had held that habeas corpus was the
only remedy open to the petitioner Rose, inasmuch as time for appeal
had passed.' 6 The further reasoning was advanced that since the statute
had been declared unconstitutional there was no jurisdiction in the
trial court, so that the proceedings in that court were wholly void.
In only one other jurisdiction have cases been found presenting the
7
exact problem of the Connellan case. Ex parte SafarikU
is the principal
10A similar ruling was made in a California case, Los Angeles County v. Seaboard
Security Corp. of America, 139 Cal. App. 497, 34 .-(2d) 191 (1934), where it was held
that if no appeal has been taken from a judgment, and it has been satisfied by payment, it stands impregnable and will prevent any action to change it, though the
statute under which it was decided has subsequently been declared unconstitutional.
And compare Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Anthony et al., 142 Kan. 670, 52 P. (2d) 12o8
(1935), in which the court said that a judgment rendered by a competent court of
record is res judicata when no appeal is taken therefrom, and cannot be set aside
or annulled by subsequent acts of the legislature even on the theory of an emergency.
U123 N. J. L. 229, 8 A. (2d) 345 (1939).
12
New Jersey Stat. Ann., 2:136.
'Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S.451, 59 S.Ct. 618, 83 L. ed. 888 (1939).
2
'In re Stanley Olbrys (mentioned in the Connellan case at 8 A. (2d) 345; no report found), and cases cited supra, note 15.
-1122 N. J. L. 507, 6 A. (2d) 388 (1939). This was followed by two other cases at
practically the same time, Ex parte Miller, 122 N. J. L. 511, 6 A. (2d) 389 (1939); Ex
parte Sterling, 122 N. J. L. 51o, 6 A. (2d) 390 (1939).
'rhis reasoning seems to come under one of the recognized exceptions to the
rule that a writ of habeas corpus will not be granted where there is adequate remedy
either by writ of error or appeal. This exception is generally stated broadly that, if
the judgment or order upon which the petitioner is imprisoned is for any reason
void and open to collateral attack; relief may be had by habeas corpus, although the
remedy by appeal is also available. See 29 C. J. 19-2o.
1725

Okla. Cr. 5o, 28 Pac.

1112 (1923).

This case was followed in Ex parte Scott,

25 Okla. Cr. 28, 219 Pac. 158 (1923); Ex parte Wade, 25 Okla. Cr. 29, 219 Pac. 159
(1923); Ex parte Heintz, 25 Okla. Cr. 11,6, 219 Pac. 16o (1923); Ex parte Spence, 25
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case of such a group of Oklahoma decisions arising in 1923. Safarik
was convicted under a law which made it a felony to have in one's possession equipment for making whiskey,' 8 and was sentenced to one year
in prison. When contested later by another party, the law was held unconstitutional, and the prisoner Safarik filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus to obtain his release. The court granted the writ saying
he was "illegally restrained of his liberty"'19 and was entitled to be discharged.
It is believed that the federal courts have not yet acted on this type
of case. Habeas corpus is only allowed in these courts to test jurisdictional errors, not those of procedure, 2° and it is not clear which classification would include such questions as are raised in the Connellan
case. However, in the case of Ex parte Baer,2 ' a federal district court,
in habeas corpus proceedings, ordered the release of a prisoner who
had been convicted in a judicial proceeding held pursuant to a Kentucky statute22 which entitled the judge trying the case to a portion of
the fine imposed. Subsequently, a closely similar Ohio statute was dedared unconstitutional on due process grounds by the Supreme Court
of the United States in Tumey v. Ohio.23 At the hearing in the Baer
case the Commonwealth admitted the invalidity of the Kentucky statute on the authority of the Tumey case, but argued that since the petitioner had challenged the statute by which the judge was given power
to try him he had waived his right to rely on the invalidity of the law.
The court decided that the petitioner was being held in custody without due process of law, and was entitled to his discharge. Any conclusion
that the petitioner had waived his constitutional right to a trial according him due process of law, simply by failure to assert the right at
Okla. Cr. 283, 220 Pac. 479 (1923); Ex parte Lockhart, 25 Okla. Cr. 429, 221 Pac.
119 18
(1923).

Chapter 1, Session Laws of Oklahoma, 1923.

1925 Okla. Cr. 50, 218 Pac. 1112 (1923).

2'Dbbie, Habeas Corpus in Federal Courts (1927) 13 Va. L. Rev. 433, 435: "The
writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts tests solely the jurisdiction or power of
the custodian to hold the petitioner in custody; it cannot be used as a writ of error
to correct mere errors of procedure which are not jurisdictional." In Beard v. Sanford, 8 U. S. L. Week 503 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1940), the court refused a writ of habeas
corpus to a petitioner who had been convicted with evidence obtained by wire tapping, despite the fact that subsequent to the petitioner's conviction this practice had
been held unlawful by the Supreme Court of the United States in Nardone v. United
States, 60 S.Ct. 266 (1939), and Weiss v. United States, 60 S. Ct. 269 (1939).
222o F. (2d) 912 (E. D. Ky. 1927). This case is critized in (1938) 14 Va. L. Rev. 483,

as being unsound in principle and against the weight of authority.
SKy. Code (Carroll, 1922 and Supp. 1924) §§ 2554a 41, 1731, 1721,
2273 U. S.510, 47 S. Ct. 437, 71 L. ed. 749 (1927).
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the invalid proceedings was branded "arbitrary." It will be noticed
that in this case the petitioner himself first raised the question of the
constitutionality of the law, while in the Connellan case the law had
already been held unconstitutional as a result of an attack by another
party. But the difference is not great, for in the Baer case a similar Ohio
law had been struck down by the United States Supreme Court, leading the Attorney General representing the Commonwealth to admit
the invalidity of the law.
In spite of the apparent conflict in the conclusions in the civil and
criminal cases as to the validity of a prior adjudication based on a
statute which is subsequently held unconstitutional, it is believed that
there are sufficient reasons of policy to sustain each of these ostensibly
inconsistent holdings.
In civil cases it has long been the rule that uniformity of decisions
should be maintained and that uncertainty should be avoided whenever possible. The courts and general public feel that there should be
stability in transactions that are carried out under the eyes of the
courts. To give a retrospective effect to the judicial determination of
invalidity inevitably will tend toward confusion and uncertainty in
the field of commercial enterprise. Such considerations, however, are
absent in the criminal cases, since ordinarily no person except the prisoner will be directly affected by the decision, and no influence will be
felt in the commercial world. No inconsistency is present, therefore, in
the position taken by the courts in criminal cases that proper protection for the liberty of the individual demands that retrospective effect
be given a determination of unconstitutionality. 24 G. MuRRAY Ssrm, JR.

INSURANCE-RECOVERY

UNDER

A

POLICY

CAUSED "SOLELY" BY ACCIDENTAL MEANS.

INSURING

AGAINST

DEATH

[Massachusetts]

In the recent Massachusetts case of Barnett v. John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Company, it appeared that the insured was injured in an
"In Ex parte Siebold, 1oo U. S. 371, 25 L. ed. 717 (1879), Mr. Justice Bradley said
at page 377, "But personal liberty is of so great moment in the eye of the law that
the judgment of an inferior court affecting it is not deemed so condusive but that
...
the question of the court's authority to try and imprison the party may be reviewed on habeas corpus by a superior court or judge having authority to award the
writ." In this case the plaintiff was convicted of violating the election laws and appealed. The court upheld the conviction saying that the election laws were valid,
but the Justice made the above statement in his opinion, by way of dictum.
124

N. E. (2d) 662 (Mass. 1939).
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automobile accident, and after being confined in the hospital for nine
days was released and went about his business. Two weeks later he became ill with pneumonia, which developed into empyema, causing his
death within two months. His insurance policy contained a clause
which provided that double indemnity would be paid the beneficiary
if the death of insured should be caused "... solely by external, violent
and accidental means ....

independently and exclusive of all other

causes." The Massachusetts court held that double indemnity should
be awarded saying that if the germs were already in his system and his
body was so weakened as a result of the accident that the germs were
enabled to develop into pneumonia, then the jury was warranted in
finding that the death of the insured was "caused solely by external, violent, and accidental means ... independently and exclusively of all
other causes." The court stated further that even if the germs entered
the body after the accident, and, because of the accident's having weakened his resistance, developed into pneumonia the jury would be war2
ranted in reaching the same conclusion as to the cause of the death.
Judging from cases in which the courts have dealt with the problem
of causation, the court in the instant case could readily have regarded
the automobile accident as the "proximate" cause of the death.s However, the provision of the policy, mentioned above, does not employ the
term "proximate" but provides for the payment of double indemnity
only where the accident is the sole cause of the death. Provisions such
as this are obviously inserted by the insurance companies for the purpose of preventing payment of double indemnity in cases where disease, or bodily or mental infirmity concur with the accident to cause
death, or in any way contribute to the death.4 Yet the courts have ig2
This statement seems to repudiate an implication of the case of Larson v. Boston Elevated Ry. Co., 212. Mass. 262, 98 N. E. lO48 (1912) in which the court said, in
speaking of germs entering the body after an accident: "If, however, her tuberculosis
came from germs introduced into her system after she had sustained these injuries,
or by the operation of some other subsequent and independent cause, then, even
though the disease would not have developed and manifested itself but for her physical condition having been weakened and her power of resistance diminished by
those injuries, it well may be that she could recover no damages for that sickness
and i consequences." 98 N. E. 1o48, 1o5o. It should be noticed that the Larson case
involved not an insurance claim, but an action for damages for negligent injuries,
and that the quoted portion of the opinion is dictum. But the language of the
Massachusetts court in the instant case would seem to indicate that the dictum of the
Larson case would not be followed by that court in such a situation.
3
Kliebenstein v. Iowa Ry. & Light Co., 193 Iowa 892, 188 N. W. 129 (1922); Watson
v. Rhinderknecht, 82 Minn. 235, 84 N. W. 798 (19o); Hoseth v. Preston Mill Co.,
49 Wash. 682, 96 Pac. 423 (0go8). See Restatement, Torts (1934) § 458.
'Barnett v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 24 N. E. (2d) 662, 663 (Mass. 1939).
The policy bound the company to pay double indemnity "Upon receipt of due proof
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nored these provisions and almost uniformly have awarded payment of
double indemnity in cases where the accident was merely the "proximate" cause of death. 5
This practice seems to have first crept into the law with the case of
North American Life &Accident Insurance Co. v. Burroughs.6 The policy provided that "death must be caused solely by such accidental injury. .. ." Here there was an accident followed by disease resulting in
death, and the court permitted the plaintiff to recover for the accidental
death. In its decision the only authority the court found necessary to cite
7
was the definition given the word "accident" in Webster's Dictionary.
The Burroughscase was relied upon in Freeman v. MercantileMutual
Accident Association,s which later decision was cited as controlling in
the principal case and in others to be mentioned in this discussion.
Further illustrative of this position is the case of Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Co. v. Meldrim.9 Here the policy provided that double indemnity would be paid in cases where the accident was "the direct, independent and exclusive cause of death." The insured was lying in the
hospital with an open wound from a very recent appendicitis operation. He happened to slip from his pillow, the jar causing an embolus
to form in the wound, ultimately resulting in his death. The court
failed to take into account the appendicitis operation, the open wound,
and the weakened condition of the body, but blandly said that the accident of slipping from the pillow was the sole cause of the death, "independent, and exclusive of all other causes."' 1
of the death of the insured . . . caused solely by external, violent and accidental
means, of which there is a visible wound or contusion on the exterior of the body
(except in case of drowning or of internal injuries revealed by an autopsy), and that
such death occurred .. . as a direct result thereof, independently and exclusive of
all other causes, . . . and provided further that the death of the Insured was not
caused directly or indirectly by disease or bodily or mental infirmity ....
rHanna v. Interstate Business Men's Ass'n, 41 Cal. App. 3o8, 182 Pac. 771 (1919);
Atlanta Accident Ass'n v. Alexander, 104 Ga. 709, 3o S. E. 939 (1898), 42 L. R. A.
188 (1899); Robinson v. National Ins. Co., 76 Ind. App. 161, 129 N. E. 707 (19i");
Freeman v. Mercantile Mutual Accident Ass'n, 156 Mass. 351, 3o N. E. 1o3, 17 L.
R. A. 753 (1892); Hickey v. Minister's Casualty Union, 133 Minn. 215, 158 N. W. 45
(1916); Schwindermann v. Great Eastern Casualty Co., 38 N. D. 584, 165 N. W. 982
(1917); U. S. Casualty Co. v. Thrush, 21 Ohio App. 129, 152 N. E. 796 (1926).
069 Pa. St. 43 (1871).
769 Pa. St. 43, 51 (1871): "An accident is 'an event which takes place without one's
foresight or expectation; an event which proceeds from an unknown cause, or is an
unusual effect of a known cause ,and therefore not expected; chance; casualty; contingency'."
'156 Mass. 351, 30 N. E. 1oi3, 17 L. R. A. 753 (1892).
924 Ga. App. 487, 101 S. E. 305 (1919).
31 The following cases involved similar facts and policies: Manufacturers' Acc.
Indemnity Co. v. Dorgan, 58 Fed. 945 (C. C. A. 6th, 1893), 22 L. R. A. 620 (1894);
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An even more surprising result was reached in Travelers' Insurance
Co. v. Melick. 11 The insured accidentally injured his foot, and gangrene
and tetanus set in. From time to time he suffered tetanic spasms causing excrutiating pain. While he was suffering from such a spasm, the
attendant momentarily left him, and upon returning found the insured
with a knife in his hands and his throat and jugular vein cut. But the
judge instructed the jury that they could find that the accident was the
"proximate" cause of the death and award recovery for the plaintiff, in
spite of the fact that the policy stated that double indemnity should be
awarded only in case death arose, "through external, violent and accidental means alone... independently of all other means."
It is worthy of note that in situations in which the disease already
existed when the accident occurred, and the effects of both contributed
to cause death, the courts have reached a different conclusion and denied recovery. 12 Such a case was that of Maryland Casualty Co. v. Morrow.13 Here the insured, who had diabetes, accidentally injured his
toe; gangrene set in, and when he was operated upon he died. The
court denied recovery saying that the accident was not the "sole and
exclusive cause of the death." And in a similar case the court said that
"The death in such a case would not be the result of accident alone, but
it would be caused partly by the disease and partly by the accident, and
4
the contract exempted the association from liability therefor."'
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Blum, 27o Fed. 946 (C. C. A. 9 th, 1921); Dewey v.
Abraham Lincoln Life Ins. Co., 218 Iowa 1220, 257 N. W. 3o8 (1934); Collins v.
Casualty Co. of America, 224 Mass. 327, 112 N. E. 634, L. R. A. 1 9 1 6E, 1203 (1916).
Another case differing from the instant decision only in the phraseology of the
policy is Sheehan v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 6 N. E. (2d) 777 (Mass. 1937), in which
an accident was followed by pneumonia resulting in the death of the insured. Here
again the court ignored the fact that the parties had expressly contracted against
payment of double indemnity in situations where death should be "caused wholly or
partly, directly or indirectly by infirmity or disease," and awarded double indemnity
even though it seems highly probable that the pneumonia must have played some
part in causing the death.
n65 Fed. 178 (C. C. A. 8th, 1894), 27 L. R. A. 629 (1895).
uNational Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896); Commercial Travelers' Mut. Acc. Ass'n v. Fulton, 79 Fed. 423 (C. C. A. 2d, 1879); Hubbard v..Mutual Acc. Ass'n, 98 Fed. 930 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1879); Stanton v. Travelers'
Ins. Co., 83 Conn. 780, 78 Ad. 317 (1910), 34 L. R. A (N S.)445 (1911); Railway Mail
Ass'n v. Weir, 24 Ohio App. 5, 156 N. E. 921 (1927); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Dorney,
68 Ohio St. 151, 67 N. E. 254 (19o3).
23213 Fed. 599 (C. C. A. 3 d, 1914), 52 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1213.
"National Masonic Acc. Ass'n v. Shryock, 73 Fed. 774, 776 (C. C. A. 8th, 1896).
That the authorities are by no means unanimous even on this proposition is illustrated by the holdings in the following cases: Scanlan v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 93 F. (ad) 942 (C. C. A. 7 th, 1937); Fetter v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 174 Mo. 256,
73 S.W. 592, 61 L. R. A. 459, 97 Am. St. Rep. 56o (19o3).
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It seems highly questionable whether there is any material difference between the two situations. In the one, the disease or bodily infirmity existed before the accident; in the other it arose after the accident. In neither situation was the disease or the accident the sole and
exclusive cause of the death, for in both situations each aggravated the
effects of the other.
It is difficult to see how the parties could have entered into contracts
which would more specifically set out the obligations of the various insurance companies. There is nothing ambiguous about the phrases,
"solely and exclusively" and "independent of all other causes." Yet the
courts have refused to adopt the ordinary meaning of these words when
so used in insurance policies. The reason for such interpretations may
be that when the average man purchases such accident policies as discussed here, he is unaware of the exact wording of the contract, and the
salesman usually does not bother to explain it to him. All the purchaser
knows is that he has bought an insurance policy which will pay him
double indemnity in case he dies as a result of an accident. But merely
because the layman is unaware of the difference between "sole" and
"proximate" cause, the courts should not in effect make a different
contract between the parties. If the insurer has in any manner acted
fraudulently, a different case would be presented, but no such theory
is relied upon by the courts in the cases under discussion. It may be
that as a matter of social policy, the public should be afforded protection against its own lack of business acumen, and the insurance companies should be prevented from limiting the extent of their liability on
policies by inserting phrases not understood or noticed by persons taking insurance. But since the legislative departments of the state governments have widely assumed the power to regulate the insurance business as it affects the public interest, it seems that the needed aid should
be extended to the insuring public by means of direct regulatory statutes adopted by the legislatures, and not by strained constructions of
contracts by the courts. In any event, this purported protection will be
indirectly neutralized by the necessary raising of insurance rates by
the companies to cover the increased risk. The net result will still involve an improved situation, however, since both the companies and
those insured will be certain of the extent of the coverage accorded by
the policies.
STANFoR ScHEwr.
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INSURANCE-WHETHER A TRAILER IS A "BUILDING" WITHIN THE TERMS
OF AN ACCIDENT POLICY. [Federal]

In Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Aird,1 the plaintiffs sued as
beneficiaries on an accident 2 policy containing a clause providing for
double indemnity in case of injuries sustained by the insured by the
'burning of a building... if the insured is therein at the time of the
... commencement of the fire." At the time of his death, the insured
w;s on the lease engaged in drilling oil wells, and was using as a combined office and dwelling a trailer which had been raised off its wheels
and placed on supporting jacks. In this condition, the trailer was destroyed by a fire, in which the insured was burned to death. The insurance company defended against paying double indemnity on the ground
that "the trailer was not and could not be 'a building' within the policy
terms." 3 The district court ruled that the trailer so situated was such a
building, and submitted to the jury the single question of whether the
death was caused by the burning of the trailer, the jury finding for the
plaintiffs. 4 On appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the
holding of the district court on the nature of the trailer as a building
within the meaning of the policy was affirmed. 5 Judge Hutcheson,
though writing the opinion for a unanimous court, went further in his
characterization of a trailer as a building than his colleagues were willing to follow. In his opinion he stated that "the trailer's mobility is of
small significance in determining whether, within the policy terms, it
is 'a building' "; for the dominant consideration lay in the fact that the
trailer was built for use as a dwelling house, and this purpose persisted
whether the trailer was fixed on jacks or was running on its wheels.6
1io8 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 5 th,. 1939).
'In the courts' opinions the policy is referred to sometimes as a life policy and
sometimes as an accident policy. The different terminology is immaterial to this
discussion.
'The Insurance Company also defended on the ground that the insured's death
was caused by a gasoline explosion which preceded the fire, rather than by the burning of the trailer. The jury decided that death resulted from the burning, and this
conclusion was accepted by the trial and appellate courts.
'Aird v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 27 F. Supp. 141 (W. D. Tex. 1939).
"Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, 1o8 F. (2d) 186 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
'Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, io8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939): "What is
dominant here, as to .the trailer, is the purpose for which it was built and used, and
to which it is primarily adapted. That purpose, to be used as a shelter and habitation for deceased, in short, a dwelling house, stands out in and dominates the case.
A dwelling house, constructed so as to be .easily movable, at times, tuning or standing on its wheels, at times, sitting fixedly on jacks or other rigid support, it is still
at all times a dwelling house."
Judge Hutcheson seems to use the term "building" and "dwelling house" sy-
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The district judge had expressly declared that a trailer when attached
to an automobile and moving along the highway "could not by any
stretch of the imagination be conceived to be a building,"r and the two
circuit judges concurring in the result reached by Judge Hutcheson
specifically limited their holding to "this trailer, circumstanced as it
was at the time of the fire." s
Despite the fact that courts have occasionally purported to set up
a general definition capable of covering the meaning of the word
"building," 9 an examination of numerous case holdings makes it dear
that the term is given widely varying significance by the courts when
different issues are involved. Each decision is likely to furnish its own
conclusion as to the import of the word, and a determination in one
case that a certain structure is a "building," may be given no weight as
precedent for the question arising in a different type of case.' 0 Nor do
the courts necessarily tend to adopt popular conceptions or the layman's understanding of the scope of the term.- Thus a fence to be put
around a courthouse was held to be a "building" within the provisions
of a statute requiring certain procedure for the letting of contracts for
the construction of "public buildings"; 12 and the English chancery
court decided that a trelliswork screen erected by the tenant on the
leasehold was a "building," the erection of which violated a covenant
in the lease whereby the tenant promised not to construct any "building" without the consent of the landlord.' 3
Although the fact that a structure is fixed to the land and not
nonymously; but for the purpose of the principal case this usage would have no
significance.
7
Aird v. Aetna Life Ins. CO., 27 F. Supp. 141, 143 (W. D. Tex. 1939).
8
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, io8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939).
OGreat Eastern Casualty Co. v. Blackwelder, 21 Ga. App. 586, 94 S. E. 843 (1918);
Rouse v. Catskill and N. Y. Steamboat Company, 59 Hun 80, 13 N. Y. Supp. 126
(i8g1), af'd, adopting lower court opinion, 133 N. Y. 679, 31 N. E. 623 (1892); State
v. Lintner, i9 S. D. 447, 104 N. W. 205 (1905).
"In the principal case the concurring judges, Sibley and Holmes, denied that the
burglary cases cited by Judge Hutcheson were in point in regard to the meaning of
an accident policy. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, xo8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5 th,
1939).
2Courts sometimes adopt the interpretation of the word "building" as used by
the layman when such interpretation will strengthen their argument toward the desired result. See Rouse v. Catskill and N. Y. Steamboat Company, 59 Hun 8o, 13 N. Y.
Supp. 126 (1891).
2Swasey v. Shasta County, 141 Cal. 392, 74 Pac. 1031 (1903).
"Wood v. Cooper, [1894] 3 Ch. 671. Another English case held that the side guardwall of a bridge constituted a "building" for purposes of a statute making owners of
abutting buildings liable for contributions to the cost of paving the streets. Arnell v.
London and North Western Ry. Co., 12 C. B. 697, 138 Eng. Rep. 1077 (1852).
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capable of being easily adapted for movability aids in identifying it as
a "building," the conclusion does not follow that movable objects can
not be held to fall within the same classification. In cases arising under
the common law or under criminal statutes defining burglary as "breaking and entering a building. . .", a sheep wagon used as habitation by
sheepherders on the range was held to be a "building,"' 4 and a popcorn and peanut vendor's wagon was given the same standing.' 5 Similarly the New Jersey court held a movable lunch wagon to be a "building" within the meaning of a fire ordinance requiring inspection of
buildings by city officials. 1 6 Freight cars have been denominated
"buildings" in cases arising under burglary' 7 and arson s statutes. But
as against these decisions, one court ruled that a box car is not a "building" such as to satisfy the clause in a deed that the grantee-railway
should erect a building for a depot on the land conveyed. 19 A floating
wharf for receiving, storing, and forwarding goods in river traffic was
found to be subject to a merchanics' lien under a statute allowing such
liens to be filed against "buildings." 20 In Inter-Ocean Casualty Co. v.
Warfield,21 the Arkansas court, construing an insurance policy provision
closely similar to the one involved in the principal case, held that the
insured was entitled to recover for injuries suffered in a fire which
burned a "quarter boat" in which insured and other workmen lived
while employed by the government on a river improvement project.
Despite the apparent readiness of the courts to find that objects
adapted to movability are "buildings," a Maryland decision held that
the term "building" could not be appropriately applied to a schoolhouse which was constructed so as to rest directly on the ground without any foundation, and which, though it had on occasion been moved
from place to place within the city, could only be moved by being
taken to pieces and transported section by section to the new location,
22
to be reassembled there.
"State v. Ebel,

92 Mont. 413, 15 P. (2d) 233 (1932).
5People v. Burley, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 213, 79 P. (2d) 148 (1938).
'GTownof Montclair v. Amend, 68 Ad. io67 (19o8), aff'd, 76 N. J. L. 625, 72 Ad.
360 (19o9).
2-State v. Anderson, 154 Iowa 701, 135 N. W. 405 (1912) (wheels and trucks of
car had been removed, and body rested on timbers on ground).
"8State v. Lintner, 19 S. D. 447, 1o4 N. W. 205 (195o).
"St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Berry, 86 Ark. Bo9, 11o S. W. 1o49 (19o8) (deed did not use
word "building"; it called for "depot" to be put on land, and court held "depot"
necessarily involves a "building").
"Olmsted v. McNall, 7 Blackf. 387 (Ind.1845).
2173 Ark. 287, 292 S. W. 129 (1927).
=Whiteley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 113 Md. 541, 77 At. 882

(1910).
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Obviously, no simple rule of thumb generalization can be applied to
determine whether an object will be classified as a building or as a
non-building. But the apparent inconsistencies among decisions, and
the outwardly surprising rulings which sometimes appear can very
often be fully explained or justified by an examination of the individual cases, with regard to the particular end to be attained by holding
that a structure is or is not a building. Where the public purpose of a
statute or the private purpose of a contract can be served only by finding that a "building" does or does not exist, the courts will reach the
conclusion needed to effectuate that purpose-within the bounds of
rational determination, of course. Thus in the portable schoolhouse
case,23 the Maryland court was confronted with a statute which required
that before a city passed an ordinance for the opening of a new street,
it must file with certain officials a map showing the location of all
buildings which were so situated as to be disturbed by the opening of
the new street. In the instance in question, the map filed by the city had
not marked the position of the portable schoolhouse, though it was in
the route of the proposed street. The court was clearly correct in holding that the schoolhouse was not a building within the meaning of the
statute, inasmuch as the structure could readily be moved out of the
area without damage, and thus could not become the subject of a
claim against the city for compensation. On the other hand, the protection of the public against the theft and destruction of property requires that burglary and arson statutes be given broad application, and
thefts or burnings involving structures of doubtful classification should
be included within the penalties of the statutes. 24 Similarly the public
Whiteley v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 113 Md. 541, 77 At.
(1910).
t

882

" People v. Burley, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 213, 79 P. (2d) 148 (1938); State v. Anderson, 154 Iowa 701, 135 N. W. 405 (1912); State v. Sanders, 81 Kan. 836, io6 Pac. 1o29
(191o) (cave mostly below the surface of the ground but having a roof and a door
made of lumber was held to be a "building" within a statute making it a misdemeanor to injure or destroy the doors and windows of a building); State v. Ebel, 92
Mont. 413, 15 P. (2d) 233 (1932); State v. Lintner, 19 S.D. 447, 104 N. W. 205 (19o5).
But cf. Rouse v. Catskill and N. Y. Steamboat Company, 59 Hun 8o, 13 N. Y. Supp.
126 (x891), aff'd, adopting lower court opinion, 133 N. Y. 679, 31 N. E. 623 (1892), in
which a statute provided that any person allowing liquor to be sold in a "building"
of his ownership should be liable in damages to dependents of one who drinks liquor
in the building and whose subsequent death is caused by the resulting intoxication.
The court held that a river steamboat was not a building within this statute. If the
public needs such protection at all, that need would seem to extend to the selling of
intoxicants on steamboats as well as in saloons. But the court openly expressed its
disapproval of the statute and declared that its application should be strictly limited
and not extended beyond its "evident meaning."
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*interest in guarding against loss of life and property by the fire justified
the holding that the lunch wagon was a building within the terms of
the fire inspection ordinance.25 Further, the statute requiring a specific
procedure for the letting of contracts to construct public buildings presupposes that the protection of the public against the misusing of public funds by government officials demands such regulations. Since the
funds may be wrongly expended in building a fence around a courthouse as well as in building the courthouse itself, the court very properly held that such a fence was a building within the statute. 26 When
the argument was made to the Indiana court that the statute providing
for mechanics' liens on buildings could not be applied t6 floating
wharves, the answer was that "the statute, being remedial, should receive such a construction as most effectually to meet the beneficial end
in view, and to prevent a failure of the remedy." 27 And in order to
enable the workmen who had repaired the wharves to enforce payment
for their services, the wharves were held to be "buildings."
Where the term "building" as employed in a private contractual instrument is before the court for interpretation, the same considerations
are involved. Whether or not a certain structure is included in the reference must depend on which decision will carry out the purpose and
intention of the parties. Thus, when the landowner conveyed land to
a railway company with the stipulation in the deed that as part of the
consideration for the conveyance the railway should maintain a depot
on the land, it seems certain that the landowner was demanding something more substantial than a boxcar parked on a side track and available for storing freight. He contemplated a permanent structure for
the accommodation of passengers and freight, such as a railroad ordinarily erects at stopping places along the line.28 And the English landlord who desired to prevent his tenant from putting up buildings on
the leased property without permission, may well have been as anxious
to avoid having his premises defaced or his adjoining property injured
by the contruction of a trelliswork screen as by the raising of a stable
or woodshed. 29 In the insurance contract, the intention of the parties
is likewise controlling, with the courts here having available for use the
established rule that the terms of the policy are to be construed most
2 Town of Montclair v. Amend, 68 Atl. 1067 (igo8), aff'd, 76 N. J. L. 625, 72 Ad.
360 (i9o9)2Swasey v. Shasta County, 141 Cal. 392, 74 Pac. io3i (19o3).

2Olmsted v. McNall, 7 Blackf. 387, 388 (Ind. 1845).
2St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Berry, 86 Ark. 3o9, 11o S. W. 1049 (1908)"Wood v. Cooper, [1894] 3 Ch. 671.
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strongly against the insurer.30 Where the insured lived even temporarily
in the boat in which he was burned, it would seem that a court need
apply no particular favoritism to the insured to conclude that for the
purposes of this case the boat was a building within the terms of the
insurance contract. 31 It is no doubt true that the company did not intend to insure against all hazards to life and limb attendant on travelling
by boat. But unless the fire causing the injuries of insured was of such
a nature as to be likely to occur only in the case of boats as distinguished
from structures attached to land, the particular loss involved is not
outside the intended coverage of the policy. Similarly, in the principal
case when insured died in a fire which burned his trailer, his death was
caused by such a disaster as the parties must have contemplated-so
long as the occurrence of the fire was not peculiarly affected by the fact
32
that a trailer, rather than an immovable structure was involved.
When a trailer is attached to an automobile and moving along the
highway, persons riding in it are doubtlessly subjected to various kinds
of risk which insurance companies never intended to assume in writing
policies covering "death by the burning of a building." 33 If the trailer
is damaged in a manner characteristic of automobile accidents, and
burns as a result thereof, the insurer should not be held liable under
such policy terms. But if the burning was not materially influenced by
the character of the trailer as a travelling structure, imposing liability
on the insurer does not seem unreasonable, because only the type of risk
contemplated in the policy is involved. Thus, neither the restrictive
view of the concurring judges nor the expansive declarations of Judge
Hutcheson would seem to include a safe generalization. Whether a
trailer moving on the highway or stationed on a lot can furnish the
subject of "the burning of a building" within the terms of the policy,
should depend on whether the fire occurs in a manner and effect usual
in the case of the burning of immovable structures.
FORREST WAL.
Stroehmann v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N. Y., 300 U. S. 435, 57 S. Ct. 6o7, 81 L.
ed. 732 (1937); Great Eastern Casualty Co. v. Blackwelder, 21 Ga. App. 586, 94 S- E.
843 (1918); Vance, Insurance (2d ed., 193o) § 179.
mInter-Ocean Casualty Co. v. Warfield, 173 Ark. 287, 292 S. W. 129 (1927).
=Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, io8 F. (2d) 136 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939). Of course, the
risk of being burned in a trailer is greater than the risk in a fireproof house, because
trailers are flimsy and often made of inflammable materials. But there seems no difference between the risk in a trailer and in an insubstantial wooden immovable
structure, which latter would be conceded to be a "building."
"'See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Aird, 1o8 F. (2d) 136, 138 (C. C. A. 5 th, 1939). Judges
Sibley and Holmes in the concurring opinion said: "While so used [a trailer rolling
down the highway] the risk of collapse and perhaps of fire would be very different."
Written in collaboration with the Editors.
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INTERSTATE COMMERCE-VALIDITY OF SALES TAx AS APPLIED TO COMMODITIES SHIPPED INTO STATE FROM ANOTHER STATE. [United States

Supreme Court]
The clause in the Federal Constitution providing that commerce
among the several states shall be regulated by Congress' has never been
interpreted as imposing an absolute prohibition on state action in this
field. And in order to insure the harmonious operation of powers reserved to the states with those conferred upon the national government,
it has been necessary for the courts to make a reconciliation of competing constitutional demands. It is evident that commerce between the
states must not be unduly hindered by state action, and that at the
same time power to lay taxes for the support of a state government
2
must not be too strictly curtailed.
A state-imposed tax which operates to regulate commerce between
the states to an extent that infringes the power conferred upon Congress clearly exceeds constitutional limitations.3 Any form of state tax-

ation the effect of which is to place interstate commerce at a competitive
disadvantage with intrastate commerce is an unconstitutional exercise
of taxing power 4 But the mere fact that a tax has an incidental and indirect effect is no cause to relieve those engaged in interstate commerce
of their just share of state tax burdens. 5 There is no prohibition of nondiscriminatory taxation of the instrumentalities of interstate com2u. S. Const. Art. I, § 8, d. 3.
2Board of County Comm'rs, Jackson County, Kansas v. United States, 3o8 U. S.
343, 60 S. Ct. 285, 84 L. ed. 233 (1939); Ford Motor Co. v. Beauchamp, 308 U. S. 331,
6o S. Ct. 273, 84 L. ed. 230 (1939); South Carolina Highway Dept. v. Barnwell, 303
U. S. 177, 58 S. Ct. 510, 82 L. ed. 734 (1938); Brown v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 S. Ct.
1091, 29 L. ed. 257 (1885); Woodruff v. Parham, 8 Wall. 123, 19 L. ed. 382 (U. S. 1868).
3
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1, 6 L. ed. 23 (U. S. 1824).
4J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938)
(state tax on gross receipts derived from interstate sales); Fisher's Blend Station v.
State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 650, 56 S. Ct. 6o8, 8o L. ed. 956 (1936) (tax on gross receipts of radio broadcasting station); Crew-Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 215 U. S. 292,
38 S. Ct. 126, 62 L. ed. 295 (1917); Western Union v. Kansas, 216 U. S. 1, 3o S. Ct.

190, 54 L. ed. 355 (1910) (license fee on percentage of entire capital stock); Galveston,
H. & S. A. Ry. v. Texas, 210 U. S. 217, 28 S. Ct. 638, 52 L. ed. io31 (19o8) (privilege
tax on gross receipts from interstate transportation); Philadelphia 9- S. M. S. S. Co.
v. Pennsylvania, 122 U. S. 326, 7 S. Ct. 1118, 3o L. ed. 1200 (1887); Morgan v. Parham,
s6 Wall. 471, 21 L. ed. 3o3 (U. S. 1872) (state property tax on movable property em-

ployed in interstate commerce).
5
Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 3o3 U. S. 250, 58 S. Ct. 546, 82 L. ed.
823 (1938); American Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis, 250 U. S. 459, 39 S. Ct. 522, 63 L. ed. 1o84
(1919)-
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merce. 6 Property is taxable before its movement across a state boundary,7 and likewise after such movement has terminated.8
In the recent case of McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining
Co.,9 the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of whether a New
York City sales tax violated the commerce clause. New York City, duly
authorized by the state legislature, placed a two per cent tax on purchases of tangible personal property. The respondent, a Pennsylvania
corporation, produced coal in its mines in that state and sold it to consumers and dealers (largely public utility and steamboat companies) in
New York City. The contracts of sale were made by the company
through its New York City sales office. The coal was generally moved
by rail from the mine to the Jersey City dock, and thence by barge to
the point of delivery at the purchasers' plants or steamships. Having
paid the sales tax, the respondent sought an order directing the comptroller to make a refund, contending that the tax was an infringement
upon interstate commerce. The Supreme Court, with three Justices dissenting, held the tax valid. As a basis for its position, the Court stated
that taxation of a local business, separate and distinct from transportation which was interstate commerce, was not forbidden merely because
it was induced or occasioned by such business. The coal upon transfer
of possession to the purchaser at the end of an interstate journey was
no longer in interstate commerce, and was subject to the sales tax because the transfer of possession was the taxable event, regardless of the
time and place of the passing of title. The Court agreed that a state
tax upon the operations of interstate commerce measured by gross receipts derived from such commerce was an infringement of the commerce clause, but it held that this tax was conditioned a local activity,
i. e., delivery of goods within the city, so that there was neither discrimination against nor obstruction of interstate commerce.
The respondent corporation, however, insisted that a distinction
be made between sales with no previous contract, transacted after passage into another state, and sales the contracts for which when made
OSouthern Ry. v. Watts, 26o U. S. 519, 43 S. Ct. 192, 67 L. ed. 395 (1923); Wells
Fargo & Co. v. Nevada, 248 U. S. 165, 39 S. Ct. 62, 63 L. ed. i9o (1918).
7
Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U. S. 1, 54 S. Ct. 34, 78 L. ed. 131 (1933); Bacon v.
Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 33 S. Ct. 299, 57 L. ed. 615 (1913); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 57,
6 S. Ct. 475, 29 L. ed. 715 (1886).
'General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 28 S. Ct. 475, 52 L. ed. 754 (19o8); American Steel & Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365, 48 L. ed. 538 (1go4); Brown
v. Houston, 114 U. S. 622, 5 S. Ct. 1091, 29 L. ed. 257 (1885).
"6o S. Ct. 388, 84 L. ed. 343 (1940).
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contemplated transportation across a state line. It maintained that
sales of the latter class were protected by the commerce clause. In this
respect Banker Brothers v. Pennsylvania'o presented a problem somewhat similar to the present situation. In that case a local automobile
dealer sought to combat a one percent tax imposed upon sales of automobiles within the state. Its contention was that the tax was a violation
of the commerce clause, since the cars came from a manufacturer in
another state in response to the dealer's orders. But the court found the
taxable transaction wholly intrastate, there being no agency relationship between manufacturer and dealer in so far as the ultimate purchaser was concerned. Since title was transferred from manufacturer to
dealer, and from de'aler to purchaser, there were two sales. This case
then, cannot be considered as authority, technically, for the present
decision on this point, for it would make no difference whether the
shipment interstate came before or after the purchaser's orders. The
second sale was intrastate and taxable as such.
In Wiloil Corporationv. Pennsylvania"l the factual situation was
somewhat different and more closely analogous to the principal case.
An order for a shipment of oil was placed by a Pennsylvania customer
with a distributor having headquarters in Philadelphia. Pursuant to
this order, the distributor purchased oil in Delaware and had the shipment made directly to the customer. The Court in sustaining a sales
tax upon the transaction, held that interstate shipment was neither
contemplated nor required by the contract for sale, and since the orders
could have been filled from sources in Pennsylvania, it deemed the interstate transportation merely incidental. However, it is doubtful that
this case is absolute authority for the Court's refusal in the BerwindWhite case to make a distinction between sales contemplating and requiring interstate movement, and sales made after such shipment.
Closer to the principal case is GraybarElectric Co. v. Curry,'2 which
was decided upon the authority of the Banker Brothers and Wiloil
cases. Alabama purchasers ordered goods from a dealer in electrical
supplies who maintained a sales office and warehouse in that state. The
goods, were shipped directly from an out of state manufacturer to the
Alabama purchaser, the manufacturer billed the dealer, and the dealer
billed the purchaser. The dealer also maintained a warehouse in
Georgia, and orders which could not be filled from stock in the AlaS. Ct. 38, 56 L. ed. 168 (1911).
U. S. 169, 55 S. Ct. 358, 79 L. ed. 838 (1935).
S. Ct. 139, 84 L. ed. 97 (1939).

10222 U. S. 210, 32
294
226o
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bama warehouse were billed by direct shipment to the purchasers from
the Georgia warehouse. The first of these situations involved two sales
and, except that it necessitated but one delivery, was analogous to the
Banker Brothers case. The second situation was very close to the principal case, the goods being supplied from stock of the dealer warehoused
out of the state and requiring interstate delivery to reach the purchaser.
Contracts were presumably made prior to the shipment across a state
boundary and obviously contemplated such shipment, but the Court
sustained a sales tax in both situations. The sales were held to be local
transactions, the interstate character of the shipment was deemed to
be incidental, and the contracts for the sales were thought neither to
require nor contemplate transportation in interstate commerce.
The Berwind-White case differs from the second method of distribution in the Graybar case in that no coal was stored in New York so
that any fulfillment of orders necessitated an interstate shipment. Yet
the Court said "we have sustained the tax where the course of business
and agreement for sale plainly contemplated the shipment interstate in
fullfillment of the contract," 13 and cited the Wiloil and Graybar cases.
It is to be noted that in those cases, the Court specifically stated that
the contracts for the sales did not contemplate nor require interstate
shipment. Regardless of this inference to the contrary, the Court here
decided that commerce would be subjected to no greater burden
whether the contracts were solicited before or after the interstate ship4
ment.
It was further contended that the conclusion reached in the present
case would be inconsistent with those decisions which held invalid attempts to tax the occupation of soliciting orders for the purchase of
goods to be shipped into the taxing state. However, the Court stated
"McGoldrick v. Benwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S. Ct. 388, 397, 84 L. ed.

343 (1940).
"Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 3o6 U. S. 62, 59 S. Ct. 376, 83 L. ed. 488
(1939) (use tax made collectible by local agents of foreign corporation); Monamotor
Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. ed. 1141 (x934) (license fee on motor vehicle fuel); Federal Compress & Warehouse Co. v. McLean, 291 U. S. 17 , 5 4 S. Ct.
267, 78 L. ed. 622 (1934) (license tax on operators receiving and shipping cotton interstate); Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query, 286 U. S. 472, 52 S. Ct. 631, 76 L. ed. 1232 (1932)
(gasoline storage tax); Bacon v. Illinois, 227 U. S. 504, 33 S. Ct. 299, 57 L. ed. 615
(1913) (local tax on grain in private elevators prior to interstate shipment); General
Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U. S. 211, 28 S. Ct. 475, 52 L. ed. 754 (1908) (inspection fee on
oil awaiting shipment to out of state destination); American Steel 8- Wire Co. v.
Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 24 S. Ct. 365 ,48 L. ed. 538 (19o4) (merchants tax on nonresident
manufacturing company making local distribution); Coe v. Errol, 116 U. S. 517, 6
S. Ct. 475, 29 L. ed. 715 (1886) (logs intended for transportation into another state).

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. i

that such rule was narrowly limited to fixed-sum license taxes imposed
on the business mentioned. The taxes in those cases seem to have been
aimed at suppression of this business when brought into competition
with intrastate sales, and dearly should be declared invalid.
It was last argued that the tax was measured by gross receipts derived from interstate sales and thus reached for taxation commerce both
within and without the taxing state.15 The Court admitted that a "tax
upon the operation of interstate commerce measured either by its volume or the gross receipts from it"16 would infringe upon the commerce
clause for this very reason;17 but it held that this tax was upon a local
sale- "a local activity [,] delivery of goods within the taxing state upon
their purchase for consumption"' 8-there being no attempt to tax anything in Pennsylvania. The Court said:
"The effect of the tax, even though measured by the sales
price, as has been shown, neither discriminates against nor obstructs interstate commerce more than numerous other state
taxes which have repeatedly been sustained as involving no prohibited regulation of interstate commerce."'19
Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, in whose dissent Justices McReynolds and
Roberts concurred, felt that the delegation to Congress of power to
regulate commerce among the states had as its purpose the safeguarding
of a free national market and the prevention of erection of state trade
barriers. The case of Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District," established the doctrine that a state cannot tax interstate sales. The Court
there held invalid a tax imposed upon an agent soliciting orders for
subsequent delivery from an extrastate merchant. The actual decision
in the case was satisfactory, but its dictum seemingly stated too universal
1

Gwin, White SePrince v. Henneford, 3o5 U. S. 434, 59 S. Ct. 325, 83 L. ed. 272
(1939);
Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938).
16
McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed.
343 (194o).
17
j. D. Adams Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365 (1938) held
invalid a gross income tax upon an Indiana corporation engaged in the manufacture
of goods a portion of which were sold outside the state. The tax was found to be not
upon the local privilege of maintaining a manufacturing business, but upon the
gross .receipts of interstate sales. Mr. Justice Stone pointed out, however, that the
tax would have been sustained "had it been conditioned upon the exercise of the
franchise or its privilege of manufacturing in the taxing state." McGoldrick v.
Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 6o S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed. 343 (1940).
2$McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 6o S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed.
343 (x94o).
19McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 60 S. Ct. 388, 398, 84 L. ed.
343 (x94o)012o U. S. 489, 7 S. Ct. 592, 3o L. ed. 694 (1887).
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a rule in the declaration that "Interstate commerce cannot be taxed at
all, even though the same amount of the tax should be laid on domestic
commerce .... ,21 The Chief Justice did not go this far but stated a
general rule that state taxation of interstate commerce "either by laying the tax upon the business which constitutes such commerce or the
privilege of engaging in it, or upon the receipts, as such, derived from
it"22 would be beyond the limitations set by the Constitution.23 He
further thought it was a direct burden on interstate commerce since it
was imposed immediately upon the gross receipts of that commerce.
The minority argued for disallowance of the tax on still another
ground-the possibility that each state through which the commerce
passed might impose similar taxes with equal right. It contended that
Pennsylvania might tax the shipment of the coal just as New York has
taxed the delivery, and in that manner subject the interstate commerce
to a double burden. The majority held the delivery an event taxable
only in New York and in that way attempted to avoid the argument of
cumulative taxation. But the contention was not conclusively answered.
The Chief Justice considered the shipment, transshipment, and delivery all integral parts of an interstate sale and saw no reason why New
York should have more right to tax than Pennsylvania. It is but a matter of conjecture as to what the Court would do in the event that Pennsylvania attempted to tax the sales by virtue of the shipment within
that state. It might, as the majority hints here, invalidate such a tax in
the state of origin by holding the delivery the only taxable event of the
transaction. But the minority has raised a point which is not decided
24
here, and which, in the near future may arise for determination.
This decision has adopted the test of transfer of possession as the
point where interstate commerce ceases for purposes of a nondiscrim"Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489, 497, 7 S. Ct. 592, 596,
go L. ed. 694 (1887).
2McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 6o S. Ct. 388, 400, 84 L. ed.
343 (1940).
23J. D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U. S. 307, 58 S. Ct. 913, 82 L. ed. 1365
(1938); Fisher's Blend Station v. State Tax Comm., 297 U. S. 65o, 56 S Ct. 6oS, 8o L.
ed. 956 (1936).
2
Thomas Reed Powell suggests that Pennsylvania would hardly impose a tax
upon the shipment for such would be prejudicial to its own coal industry. For a
complete discussion of the case, see Powell, New Light on Gross Receipts Taxes-The
Berwind-White Case (194o) 53 Harv. L. Rev. gog.
It is also of interest to note McGoldrick v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
6o S. Ct. 670, 84 L. ed. 672 (194o) which sustained the New York City sales tax when
applied to sales within the city of fuel oil from storage tanks in New Jersey. The oil
was transported to New York piers and then sold and delivered to ships from foreign
countries.
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inatory sales tax. In effect, this is the adoption of the rule established in
the use tax cases which hold that once the goods come to rest a nondiscriminatory tax upon use or enjoyment may be levied on the users
to be collected by the seller. 25 Technically, interstate commerce may
now be said to end when there is a transfer of possession of the goods;
but practically it may be said that interstate sales are taxable (if the
sales tax is nondiscriminatory) since the consummation of every interstate sale must necessarily include "a coming to rest" at point of destination and an unloading or delivery of the physical object sold.
FRANK

C. BEDINGER,

JR.

PROCEDURE-WHETHER RADIO BROADCASTING COMPANY IS SUBJECT TO
JURISDICTION OF COURTS OF STATE IN WHICH BROADCAST Is HEARD
OVER LOCAL AFFILIATED STATION.

[Washington]

The Columbia Broadcasting Company, a New York corporation,
had leased the facilities of the Queen City Broadcasting Company, a
Washington State corporation, to retransmit programs originating in
Columbia's studios, and in studios of affiliated stations. These programs were furnished to the local station over program transmission
lines. In the course of a Columbia broadcast emanating from an affiliated station in St. Louis, and broadcast in Washington State through
the facilities of the Queen City station, statements allegedly defaming
the Waldo Hospital Association of Washington were made. The Hospital Association, in an action for damages for defamation, joined the
Columbia Broadcasting Company as defendant with the Queen City
Company. In an original application to the Supreme Court of Washington for a writ of prohibition,' Columbia questioned the power of
the State of Washington to subject it to the jurisdiction of its courts.
The Washington court held, in State ex rel. Columbia BroadcastingCo.
25Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 3o6 U. S. 62, 59 S. Ct. 376, 83 L. ed.
488 (1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U. S. 577, 57 S. Ct. 524, 81 L. ed. 814
(1937); Monamotor Oil Co. v. Johnson, 292 U. S. 86, 54 S. Ct. 575, 78 L. ed. 1141
(1934)'This device has been increasingly and effectively employed in preventing trial
courts from taking jurisdiction where none exists in fact, and has done much to reduce the unnecessary time and expense of litigating issues beyond the power of the
trial court to entertain. Jardine v. Superior Court in and for Los Angeles County,
213 Cal. 301, 2 P. (2d) 756 (1931), 79 A. L. R. 291 (1932); Westinghouse Electric and
Mfg. Co. v. Justices' Court of Corcoran Tp. in and for Kings County, 79 Cal. App.
413, 250 Pac. 1104 (1926); Baltimore Mail S. S. Co. v. Fawcett, 269 N. Y. 379, 199
N. E. 628 (1936).

19401

RECENT CASES

v. Superior Court of King County,2 with one justice dissenting, that
Columbia was "doing business' 3 in Washington State to an extent sufficient to make it amenable to suit in the courts of that state, and that
service of process on the general manager of the Queen City Company
was good service of process on Columbia.
The complexity of the problem of a state's power over a nonresident
corporation doing business in the state is attested by a marked lack of
harmony in both state and federal decisions.4 No general rules are deducible from the decided cases and the courts seem content to decide
each case upon its own facts. 5 The novel character of an advertising
business carried on through the medium of radio, renders factual analogies both attenuated and unsatisfactory.
"The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," 6 but when, in
the absence of express consent, does a state have this power over a nonresident corporation? In general, a state may exclude a foreign corporation from doing domestic business within the state,7 and it may impose
the condition precedent to its doing such business that it submit to service of process of the state courts.8 Further, a state may impose such
conditions even on corporations engaged in interstate commerce, so far
as acts done within the state are concerned. 9 Absent express consent,
three possible theories may be suggested as supplying the foundation of
the court's jurisdiction over foreign corporations doing business within
296 P. (2d) 248 (Wash. 1939). An appeal to the United States Supreme Court is
pending, 8 U. S. L. Week 493.
'As to the scope of the term "doing business," see: Restatement, Conflict of Laws
(1934) §§ 167-181; Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 88-93; note (1929) 6o A. L.
R. 994,'People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 38 S. Ct. 233, 6-L. ed. 587 (1918); International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct.
944, 58 L. ed. 1479 (1914); Green v. C. B. & Q. Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530, 27 S. Ct. 595, 51
L. ed. 916 (x9o7); Rishmiller v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 134 Minn. 261, 159 N.
W. 272 (1916); Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 88.2, 89.1; Fead. Jurisdiction
Over Foreign Corporations (1926) 24 Mich. L. Rev. 633.
1
St. Louis S. W. Ry. of Texas v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245, 57 L. ed.
486 (1913); Hutchinson et al. v. Chase & Gilbert Inc. et al., 45 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A.
:d, 193o).
'McDonald v. Maybee, 243 U. S. 90, 91, 37 S. Ct. 343, 61 L. ed. 6o8 (1917).
TPaul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1868); Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
8Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32
Harv. L. Rev. 871, 879-8o.
gInternational Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. ed.
1479 (1914); Beale, The Conflict of Laws § 82.2; Scott, Jurisdiction over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (1919) 32 Harv. L. Rev. 871, 878, 886-891.
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the state. 10 One theory is that of "implied consent," presumed from the
acts of the corporation in doing business in the state."' This concept
12
has been generally discarded in the more recent decisions as fictional.
13
Another theory is that of "presence", which still is widely adhered to,
but which would seem to be inapplicable to the principal case in the
light of Bank of America v. Whiting CentralNational Bank.14 A third
theory is that of "submission,"' 5 based on principles of justice which
require a corporation doing business within a state to submit to the
jurisdiction of its courts to the extent that its laws provide for the exercise of jurisdiction and are reasonable. 16 As indicated by Judge Learned
Hand 17 with reference to the "presence" doctrine, these theories do no
more than put the question to be answered. Each of them leaves unsolved the nebulous and elusive question of whether the foreign corporation is "doing business" within the state; and an affirmative answer to this query is essential to the application of any principle giving
jurisdiction to the courts of the state.
It is not the purpose of this discussion to attempt a general examination of the judicial scope of the term "doing business"; and no
"Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 89.5, 89.6, 89.7, 89.8; Scott Jurisdiction
over Non Residents Doing Business Within a State (19g) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 871.
"In Railroad Co. v. Harris, 12 Wall. 65, 81, 2o L. ed. 354 (U. S. 1870), Mr. Justice Swayne said: "If it do business there, it will be presumed to have assented and
will be bound accordingly." Similar language is found in other cases. See, Robert
Mitchell Furniture Co. v. Selden Breck Const. Co., 257 U. S. 213 , 42 S. Ct. 84, 66 L.
ed. 2o (1921); Old Wayne Mutual Life Ass'n v. McDonough, 2o4 U. S. 8, 27 S. Ct.
236, 51 L. ed. 345 (9o7); Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404, 15 L. ed. 451
(U. S. 1855).
1In Flexner v. Farson, 248 U. S. 289, 293, 39 S. Ct. 97, 98, 63 L. ed. 250 (1919), Mr.
Justice Holmes said: "But the consent that is said to be applied in such cases is a
mere fiction, founded on the accepted doctrine that the States could exclude foreign
corporations altogether, and therefore could establish this obligation as a condition
to letting them in." See also, Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243
U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61 L. ed. 61o (1917).
"Mr. Justice Brandeis has constantly said that if a corporation does business in
a state' it is present or found there. Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank,
261 U. S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. ed. 594 (1923); Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis
Brown Co., 26o U. S. 516, 43 S. Ct. 17o, 67 L. ed. 372 (1923); Philadelphia & Reading
Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 37 S. Ct. 280, 61 L. ed. 710 (1917).
14i61 U. S. 171, 173, 43 S. Ct. 311, 312, 67 L. ed. 594 (1923), Mr. Justice Brandeis
said: "The jurisdiction taken of foreign corporations, in the absence of statutory requirement of express consent, does not rest upon a fiction of constructive presence
like 'qui facit per alium facit per se.' It flows from the fact that the corporation itself does business in the state or district in such a manner and to such an extent that
its actual presence there is established."
"Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading C. & I. Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1915).
18Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) § 89.8.
"7Hutchinson et al. v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc. et al., 45 F. (2d) 139 (C. C. A. 2d, 193o).
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cases have been found which purport to apply to the specific business
of radio broadcasting such general principles as may be thought to be
available as guides in cases involving other types of enterprises. The
case of FishersBlend Station v. Tax Commission,'8 strongly relied on
by the majority in the principal case, holds no more than that radio
broadcasting is essentially interstate in character. 19 It does not reach
the conclusion of the majority that the broadcasting company is therefore present and carrying on business20 in those states in which the
broadcast is heard. In Hoffman v. Carter,21 when that case was first
before the Supreme Court of New Jersey, language was employed from
which a conclusion contrary to that of the principal case could be inferred.22 However, on a re-appeal 23 that court expressly reserved decision on the question of whether the delivery to radio receivers in New
Jersey, of programs transmitted by the Columbia Broadcasting Company in New York, could be considered in any sense to constitute the
doing of business in New Jersey. Many cases involving other businesses
are of but negative assistance, in that they merely hold that a particular activity does not constitute doing business, and do not attempt to
state what activities do amount to doing business.24 But it is apparent
U. S. 65o, 56 S. Ct. 6o8, 8o L. ed. 956 (1936).
21This point was made by Mr. Justice Robinson, dissenting in State ex rel. Columbia Broadcasting Co. v. Superior Court for King County, 96 P. (2d) 248, 250
(Wash. 1939); and the holding of Fisher's Blend Station v. Tax Commission, 297 U. S.
65o, 56 S. Ct. 6o8, 8o L. ed. 956 (1936), would appear to be correctly confined to the
minority interpretation.
2°In Consolidated Textile Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U. S. 85, 53 S. Ct. 529, 77 L. ed.
1047 (1933) the Supreme Court of the United States reaffirmed the proposition laid
down in People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U. S. 79, 87, 38 S. Ct.
233, 235, 62 L. ed. 587 (1918) that, "The general rule deducible from all our decisions
is that the business must be of such nature and character as to warrant the inference
that the corporation has subjected itself to the local jurisdiction ..
" Engaging in
interstate commerce, alone, would not necessarily meet the requirements of this rule,
and the inference of the majority in the principal case would seem to be erroneous
in this respect.
m117 N. J. L. 205, 187 Ad. 576 (1936).
2In
117 N. J. L. 205, 187 Ad. 576, 577, 578 (1936) the court emphasized the fact
that Columbia's acts were done in New York and that but for the independent acts
of the local station nothing would transpire in the state of New Jersey.
"Hoffman v. Carter, 8 N. J. L. 379, 192 Ad. 825 (1937).
"Activity of a subsidiary corporation is not enough to constitute "doing business"
in a state, Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U. S. 333, 45 S. Ct.
25 o , 69 L. ed. 634 (1925); Peterson v. Chicago R. I. & P. Co., 205 U. S. 364, 27 S. Ct.
513, 51 L. ed. 841 (1907). Activity of an agent is not enough, Bank of America v.
Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261 U. S. 171, 43 S. Ct. 311, 67 L. ed. 594 (1923). Sending
traveling show rooms around for advertising purposes is not enough, Larkin Co. v.
Commonwealth, 172 Ky. io6, 189 S. W. 3 (1916).
1297
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that among the courts generally a practice or policy prevails whereby
a minimum of activity is held to afford a basis for finding that a corporation is doing business within a jurisdiction and thus is amenable
to service of process on its agents therein.2 5 However, the decisions are
progressively stricter in requiring more activity for a holding that jurisdiction exists for purposes of taxation and of regulation.2 6 This minimum requirement for purposes of service of process would appear to
be satisfied in the case of the Columbia Broadcasting Company, for although its programs emanated from an affiliated station outside of
Washington State, the essential ends and conceded objects of the advertising business were accomplished only when they were received in
homes all over the state. Advertising with Columbia is a business within
itself, as distinguished from mere solicitations that are incidental to a
business concern which is engaged in the actual selling and delivery of
its products. 2 7 Unlike these incidental solicitations, which are isolated

and occasional in their nature, the acts of the Columbia Broadcasting
Company are continuous. Regardless of the medium it chose, Columbia projected its advertising business into the State of Washington. It
should be answerable in the courts of Washington for wrongs arising
out of such business. Of the three possible theories of jurisdiction, it
would appear that the theory of "submission '2 8 may correctly be ap29
plied to hold Columbia subject to the jurisdiction of the state court.

But in service of process on a foreign corporation two elements are
necessary: 3 0 the transaction of business, and an agent through whom
the corporation can be reached. This agent must bear such a relation
to the corporation as to sustain the conclusion that he has power to
"International Harvester Company of America v. Commonwealth of Kentucky,
234 U. S. 579, 34 S. Ct. 944, 58 L. ed. 1479 (1914) (a continuous course of business in
Kentucky, the solicitation of orders which were sent to another state and in response
to which the machines of the Harvester Company were delivered within the state,
was held to amount to "doing business" in Kentucky to the extent which authorized
service of process on its agents engaged in conducting the business; St. Louis S. W.
Ry. of Texas v. Alexander, 227 U. S. 218, 33 S. Ct. 245 (1913) (where a railroad company establishes an office in a foreign district and its agents there attend to claims
presented for settlement, it is carrying on business to such an extent as to render it
amenable to process under the laws of that state); Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Busi-

ness

(1925) 25 Col. L.Rev. 18.
-Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business

(1925) 25 Col. L.Rev. ioi8.
"Larkin Co. v. Commonwealth, 172 Ky. io6, 189 S. W. 3 (1916), see supra note 24.
28Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) § 89.8.
"Smolik v. Philadelphia and Reading C. and I. Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y.
1915).
"Farmers' and Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566 (E. D.
Ky. 1922); Beale, The Conflict of Laws (1935) §§ 88-93.
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receive such service. 3' In the principal case this relationship could have
been found, had there been in Washington State an agent duly con34
33
sented to,32 a public official either consented to, or not consented to,
35
or a "representative agent." The failure of either the Queen City
Broadcasting Company or-its manager to fall convincingly into any of
the four named categories, as shown by an examination of the contract,36 displays an inherent weakness in the decision of the principal
case. This difficulty of finding an agent on whom process may be
served points to the need for legislation providing-for statutory agents
for the service of process on foreign broadcasting corporations.
WILLIAM S. Bums

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-PERIOD OF LIMITATION APPLICABLE TO A Surr
ON A NEW PROMISE. [Virginia]

In 1938, the plaintiff instituted suit against the defendant to recover
the balance due on a sealed promise to pay a debt made in 1923, payable on demand. The defendant filed a plea of the Statute of Limitations, alleging that suit on the instrument was barred by the ten-year
limitation. Plaintiff then gave notice of his intention to rely upon the
debtor's unsealed promise in writing, made in 1930, to pay the instrument. The defendant fied another plea of the Statute of Limitations,
alleging that the claim sued on was barred five years after the date of
the new promise. The sole issue was whether the limitation of ten
aConn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43 L. ed.
569 (1899).
3Penn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S.Ct. 344,61 L. ed.
61o (1917).

"Penn. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U. S. 93, 37 S. Ct. 344, 61
L. ed. 6io (1917).
3
2 Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association v. Phelps, 190 U. S. 147, 23 S. Ct. 707,
47 L. ed. 987 (1903).
mCommercial Mutual Accident Co. v. Davis, 213 U. S. 245, 29 S. Ct. 445, 53 L. ed.
782 (109o); Conn. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U. S. 602, 19 S. Ct. 308, 43

L. ed. 569 (1899).
"There is manfestly no question here of service upon a statutory agent, consented to or otherwise, since service was made pursuant to a Washington statute
(Rem. Rev. Stat. § 226), providing for service upon "any agent" of the corporation.
The contract between Columbia Broadcasting Company and the Queen City
Broadcasting Company provides only for a leasing of facilities and broadcasting time
for prescribed periods; and beyond a clause directing that Queen City shall obtain
as much publicity for Columbia as possible, it is authorized in no way to act for
Columbia, nor is it empowered in any respect to bind Columbia by its acts.
See, Restatement, Agency (1933) § 1.
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years upon the sealed instrument or that of five years upon the new
unsealed instrument, governed the period of limitation following the
new promise.
The Court of Appeals of Virginia, faced with a case of first impression in the jurisdiction and thus proceeding without aid of local precedent, held in Ingram v. Harris' that the new promise merely revitalized
the old debt and did not create a new and substantive contract, and
that, therefore, the original ten-year period of limitation was applicable
to the new promise.
Though this result might be considered to be in accord with the
general rule announced by courts of other states, in order to evaluate
the decision accurately, it is necessary to refer to the statutes involved
and to the interpretation put upon them by the court. The Virginia
Code of 1849 provided that in the case of a new promise, an action
could be brought "within such number of years after the said promise,
as it might originally have been maintained within upon the award or
contract... ."2 It is clear down to this point, as the court stated, that
the period applicable to the original demand would govern the period
of limitation following the new promise. When the Code was revised
in 1887, however, the phraseology was changed to provide that an action could be brought on the new promise "within such number of
years after such promise, as it might be maintained under section
twenty-nine hundred and twenty,3 if such promise were the original
cause of action."14 The revisors of the Code of igig adopted this language without charge, 5 and the identical provision appears in the Code
of 1936. 6
The established rule of statutory construction is that the legislature
will be held not to have intended to change the effect of the existing
statute unless such intention clearly appears. 7 Applying this rule, the
15 S. E. (2d) 624 (Va. 1939)2Va. Code of 1849, p. 592, C. 149, § 7.
'Section 2920 of the Virginia Code of 1887, as revised in Va. Code Ann. (1919)
§ 581o, provides that action may be brought upon any contract by writing under seal
within ten years; if it be upon a contract not under seal, within five years. The same
provision appears in Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 581o.
'Va. Code of 1887, p. 701, c. 139, § 2922.
5Va. Code Ann. (1919) § 5812.
Wa. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5812.
7Norfolk & Portsmouth Bar Ass'n v. Drewry, x61 Va. 833, 172 S. E. 282 (1934);
Parramore v. Taylor, 11 Gratt. 220 (1854). Black, Interpretation of Laws (2d ed. 1911)
594: "When statutes are codified, compiled, or collected and revised, a mere change
of phraseology should not be deemed to work a change in the law, unless there was
an evident intention, on the part of the legislature, to effect such change."
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majority of the court in the principal case was of the opinion that the
revisors in 1887 did not intend to change the meaning of the law but
merely to alter the phraseology. The provision "if such promise were
the original cause of action" was held by the majority to mean "if the
original cause of action had accrued at the date of such promise." However, if the Code of 1849 was perfectly clear, as the court itself stated, it
would seem a logical assumption that the change in the language of the
statute must have been made in order to alter the meaning. Otherwise,
there would have been no reason for adopting the new phraseclogy.
Surely the revisors would not substitute ambiguous terminology for
clear statement, yet intend the statute to retain its original meaning.
In the principal case, great weight seems to have been given to the address before the Virginia State Bar Association by Judge E. C. Burks,
one of the revisors of the Code of 1887. The court felt that since he
spoke of other changes in the Statutes of Limitations, he would have
made some reference to this particular section of the statute had the
revisors intended to make such an important change as that contended
for in this case. But Judge Burks stated that he would only refer to a
few of the more important changes, for otherwise his remarks would
assume the length of a book.8 It is entirely conceivable that he thought
this change was unimportant, and such an opinion is borne out by the
fact that this is the first case requiring a construction of the statute
since its enactment fifty-three years ago.
The insertion of the word new before the word promise in the section, "within such number of years after such [new] promise as it [the
action] might be maintained under section fifty-eight hundred and ten,
if such [new] promise were the original cause of action," as Mr. Justice
Hudgins pointed out in his dissent, 9 dearly shows that the intention
was to make the form of the new promise the determining factor in
fixing the new period of limitation. To say the least, if this interpretation had been adopted by the majority it would have done no undue
violence to the words of the statute. The better rule would seem to be
that the time should be extended by such a promise for the period allowed by law for the enforcement of simple contracts. 10
8(1891) 4 Va. St. Bar Ass'n Rep. ui5.
OSee Ingram v. Harris, 15 S. E. (2d) 624, 627 (Va. 1939).
201 Williston, Contracts (Rev. Ed. 1936) § 185.
If the intention of the revisors of the Code of 1887 was that the form of the old
contract should govern the period of limitation of the new promise, it is submitted
that such intention could have been plainly shown by employing the following language: "If any person against whom the right shall have so accrued on an award,
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As a general rule, in other states, if the acknowledgment or new
promise is made before the Statute of Limitations has run, the effect is
to set aside the operation of the statute up to the time of the acknowledgment or promise, and to start the statute running anew against the
original claim." But, when the acknowledgment or promise is made
after the bar of the statute has become complete, the period of limitation is governed by the form of the new promise. 12 Even in the latter
situation, however, there are numerous cases which apply the period of
limitation that governs the original demand.' 3 The general view proceeds upon the theory that if the acknowledgment is made before the
statute has run, it vitalizes the old debt, whereas if an acknowledgment
is made after the statute has run, it creates a new cause of action. All
authorities agree that the old debt or the moral obligation to pay, furnishes the consideration for the new promise.' 4 It is to be noted that in
or any such contract, shall, by writing signed by him or his agent, promise payment
of money on such award or contract, the -person to whom the right shall have so
accrued may maintain an action for the money so promised, within such number of
years after such promise as the originalcause of action might have been maintained
under section fifty-eight hundred and ten .... If the intention was that the form
of the new promise should govern the new period of limitation, the following language would be appropriate: "If any person against whom the right shall have so
accrued on an award, or any such contract, shall, by writing signed by him or his
agent, promise payment of money on such award or contract, the person to whom
the right shall have so accrued may maintain an action for the money so promised,
within such number of years after such promise as it might be maintained under
section fifty-eight hundred and ten, as if such new promise were an original cause
of action .. "
nDeshler v. Cabiness, 1o Ala. 959 (1847); Austin v.Bostwick, 9 Conn. 496, 25 Am.
Dec. 42 (1833); Rich v. Dupree, 14 Ga. 661 (1854); Van Patten v. Bredow, 75 Iowa
589, 39 N. W. 907 (1888); Russell v. Centers, 153 Ky. 469, 155 S. W. 1149 (1913);
Gilbert v. Collins, 124 Mass. 174 (1878); Mastin v. Branham, 86 Mo. 643 (1885);
Mason v. Rice, 18 Vt. 53 (1844). Contra: Gruenberg v. Buhring, 5 Utah 414, 16 Pac.
486 (1888) (limitation period governed by the new promise).
"Moore v. Diamond Dry Goods Co., 54 P. (2d) 553 (Ariz. 1936); McCormick v.
Brown, 36 Cal. i8o, 95 Am. Dec. 170 (1868); Coker v. Phillips, 89 Fla. 283, 103 So. 612
(1925);. Gilmore v. Green, 77 Ky. 772 (1879); Thornton's Adm'r v. Minton's Ex'r
250 Ky. 8o5, 64 S. W. (2d) 158 (1933); McNeill v. Simpson, 39 S. W. (2d) 835 (Tex.
1931); Canon v. Stanley, ioo S. W. (2d) 377 (Tex. 1936); Kuhn v. Mount, 13 Utah io8,
44 Pac. io36 (1896); Thisler v. Stephenson. 54 Wash. 6o5, 1o3 Pac. 987 (1909).
"St. John v. Garrow, 4 Port. 223, 29 Am. Dec. 280 (Ala. 1836); Dawson & Dawson
v. Godkifis, 28 Ga. 510 (1859); Sammons v. Nabers, 186 Ga. 161, 197 S.E. 284 (1938);
Bayliss v. Street, 51 Iowa 627, 2 N. W. 437 (1879); Sennott v. Homer & Hypes, 3o Ill
429 (1863).
"Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U. S. 251, 7 S. Ct. 1229, 3o L. ed. 1156 (1887); McCormick v. Brown, 36 Cal. 18o, 95 Am. Dec. 170 (1868); Pittman v. Elder, 76 Ga. 371
(1886); Spencer v. McCune, 73 Ind. App. 484, 126 N. E. 3o (192o); Spilde v. Johnson,
132 Iowa 484, 1o9 N. W. 1023 (19o6); Wilson v. Butt, 168 Va. 259, 19o S.E. 260 (1937).
Needham v. Matthewson, 81 Kan. 340, 1o5 Pac. 436 (19o9); Tolle v. Smith, 98 Ky.
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most jurisdictions, the statutes provide only that the new promise must
be in writing and signed by the party to be charged, but make no provision as to the period within which an action may be brought on the
new promise.1 5 It seems, therefore, that the courts have read into the
statutes the distinction between a promise made before and a promise
made after the bar of the statute has become complete. The decision in

the principal case would place the Virginia statute in line with the
general rule, so far as a promise made before the bar of the statute had
run is concerned. Since the case did not involve a promise made after
the bar of the statute was complete, and since the court expressed no
opinion with reference to that question, assurance is lacking as to the

court's probable holding when such a case comes before it for decision.
The Virginia statute makes no distinction between a promise made
before and one made after the running of the statute, and since it al-

lows suit on either the original demand or the new promise,16 recognition of such a distinction by the court would be unnecessary. Yet it is
difficult to see why the new period of limitation should be governed by
considerations of whether the statutory bar was already complete when

the new promise was made.' 7 Since the debt still exists in both instances, and only the remedy is gone where the bar is complete at the
time of making the new promise, it would seem that the debt should be
464, 33 S. W. 410 (1895) (no statute of limitation involved but there was a discharge
in bankruptcy; since debt was discharged, moral obligation held sufficient consideration for the new promise).
"'Atleast three states do make provision for the period of limitation which shall
be applicable following the new promise. See Ill. Rev. Stat. Ann. (Smith-Hurd, 1935)
c. 83, § 17; Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1935) c. 60, § 312; W. Va. Code (1931) c.
55, Art. 2, § 8.
2'Va. Code Ann. (Michie, 1936) § 5812.
2It may be suggested that a practical basis for the different rules exists in considerations of the meritorious character of the defendant-debtor's conduct in the two
cases. Where the bar has not yet run completely, the debtor by his new promise does
not deprive himself of any existing defense, but merely postpones the time at which
his defense of limitations may accrue. Though this is beneficial to the creditor, it
may well be that the new promise is made with a view of aiding the debtor himself,
as perhaps by persuading the creditor to refrain from immediate suit to collect the
debt. On the other hand, where the bar has been completed before the new promise
is made, the debtor seems voluntarily to give up an already perfect defense, and give
the creditor a chance to enforce the obligation where without the promise there was
no such chance. Thus, in the latter case, the debtor is more deserving of having the
doubtful question of limitations determined in his favor. In most instances, the new
promise would be made with less formality than the original promise, and to give
the debtor his merited mercy would be to enforce the limitation period applicable
to obligations in the form of the new promise. Though the courts have reached this
result, none apparently has employed this type of reasoning.
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revived in both situations. But as previously stated the new period of
limitation should be governed by the form of the new promise. The
only thing that should turn upon the distinction is the matter of pleading-whether the plaintiff would sue upon the original claim or upon
the new promise.
RODERiCK D. COLEMAN

